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Preface 
This report by Alex Nunn, is a key element in a joint project on the effects of Brain Drain by 
the AUT and NATFHE, funded via the Trades Union Congress by the Department for 
International Development (DfID). The newly created Mini Learning Fund enables trade 
unions to develop work on international development education. Eleven unions are currently 
benefiting from this funding. 
The ‘Brain Drain’ project has its origins in an international conference on higher education 
organised by the teachers’ global trade union federation, Education International, and hosted 
by the Senegalese teachers’ unions, in Dakar, Senegal, in November 2003. At that 
conference university teachers unions from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean described the 
difficulties their education systems faced in respect of migration of teachers to the 
industrialised world. They outlined the complexities and range of phenomena which lay 
behind the term ‘Brain Drain.’ Also they were concerned to emphasise that the phenomenon 
arose from many individual, rational and justifiable decisions, but in the context of conditions 
and policies which in many cases exacerbated the problems faced by universities, education 
systems and the societies for which they were vital to economic development.  
There is a recognised need to find a balance between the rights of individuals and the 
mediation of the adverse effects of ‘Brain Drain’ on countries which are losing an expensive 
and scarce resource. For example, this is the approach adopted by the Commonwealth 
Teacher Recruitment Protocol - which the National Union of Teachers (NUT) was 
instrumental in bringing about. The protocol recognises the right of teachers to migrate 
internationally on a temporary or permanent basis in furtherance of their careers, but also the 
need to protect the education systems of poor countries and prevent exploitation of scarce 
human resources. At the same time, it is clear that ‘Brain Drain’ remains a sensitive issue 
and these sensitivities need to be openly addressed as part of the debate. The argument that 
the free movement of capital must be matched by the free movement of labour is not 
comparing like with like, in terms of the relative power of capital and labour in developing 
countries. Nor are national rights included in this pseudo-equation. While some have 
difficulties with the term ‘Brain Drain’, it is both the most widely used and recognised  term, 
but one which as the Dakar conference showed, masks a number of different trends and 
issues which need to be better understood.  The issue is also a subtext to the achievement 
of the Millennium goals for education, and is likely to play a part in the global community’s 
failure to meet Millennium targets. 
The issue was taken up in a motion passed by the EI World Congress in Porto Alegre in July 
2004. AUT and NATFHE agreed to work together on the issue at that time, recognising that 
the UK had a particular responsibility as a key player in the ‘Brain Drain’ phenomenon, and 
took advantage of the TUC / DfID project financing becoming available at the right time. 
The project is aimed at raising the awareness of NATFHE and AUT members about the 
issues associated with ‘Brain Drain’ particularly as they affect education systems and 
societies which are exporters of skilled labour. It is hoped we will extend and deepen the 
debate among our members on globalisation, international development and the marketplace 
in higher education and research which has developed in recent years. We also hope it will 
contribute to the wider debate in the United Kingdom and to the debate at the world level 
being conducted under the auspices of EI. It is very much a ‘work in progress’ and a 
contribution to a debate in which we readily acknowledge, the expertise is widely dispersed. 
Our project, though focussed on higher education, has resonances for education more 
generally and also for the health service which is at least equally subject to the phenomenon 
of ‘Brain Drain.’ 
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Finally we would like to thank Alex Nunn for his report, and Gemma Freedman and the TUC 
for their active help throughout the project and DfID for their financial support. The outcomes 
of the report are the responsibility of AUT and NATFHE. 
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Executive Summary 
Background and Aims 
In December 2004 the Association of University Teachers and the College and Lecturers 
Union NATFHE jointly commissioned research to review some of the literature on ‘the Brain 
Drain’ with a specific emphasis on developing countries in Africa and on academic labour in 
the UK.  This report is the culmination of that research. 
The project aimed to review some of the available literature on the ‘Brain Drain’, to locate this 
in debates and contemporary approaches to international development and to consider 
especially the impact of the Brain Drain on Africa, where possible drawing reference to the 
impact on higher education.  The report also considers the scale of migration to work in UK 
higher education and suggests ways in which AUT/NATFHE might work together and with 
others to offset the impact of Brain Drain factors and to build the capacity of higher 
education, and those working in it, in developing countries. 
Migration is an emotive issue and debate in this country is often shaped by populist and 
right-wing arguments, sometimes with racist and xenophobic undertones.  This project aimed 
to develop a more progressive approach to the debate on migration, explicitly addressing the 
motivations behind migration decisions.  This project was shaped by a background 
understanding that the UK undoubtedly benefits enormously from skilled labour migration, 
economically, socially and culturally.  However, the project is also shaped by a concern to 
ensure that individual choices to migrate are taken freely, not as a result of political 
repression, a lack of life chances or vocational opportunities.  The project also aimed to 
assess the extent to which skilled labour migration, and the unequal relationships between 
rich and developing countries which drives it, is further embedding that inequality.  Failing to 
address these issues, risks leaving the debate on migration to those that seek to use the 
issue to generate a regressive and dangerous politics of fear and difference. 
The Importance of Skills and Education for Development and the Importance of the 
‘Brain Drain’ 
The contemporary development context is dominated by strategies to reduce poverty in the 
least developed countries of the world.  These strategies are framed by the overarching 
Multilateral Development Goals to eradicate poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary 
education, promote gender equality, reduce child poverty, improve maternal health, combat 
disease and promote environmental sustainability. It is now widely acknowledged that 
human, social and institutional capacity are central to successful development, with 
education being a key component in building this capacity.  In this context, skilled labour is of 
crucial importance for developing countries to overcome the social and institutional barriers 
to successful development.  In addition to this, most contemporary economic theories of 
growth highlight the key importance of skills to economic performance and development 
potential. 
In this context, the loss of skilled labour is of vital importance for development and 
development potential.  The loss of teachers undermines the ability of schools and education 
systems to function, the loss of nurses impairs efforts to deliver even basic healthcare and 
public health programmes and the loss of other skilled professionals acts as a barrier to 
institutional capacity building, the efficient utilisation of external assistance and private sector 
growth.  The ‘Brain Drain’, as the flow of skilled professionals out of developing countries has 
become known, thus marks a potentially serious barrier to economic growth, development 
and poverty reduction. 
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Finally, education is important not just in relation to its impact on economic growth but as a 
social good in its own right.  It is a process of re-learning the collective knowledge of society 
for each successive generation and learning from social and political mistakes.  It is thus a 
core mechanism in cultural reproduction and historical social learning and development. As 
such, the loss of highly educated individuals is a loss of collective social knowledge vested 
by society in them.  It is also a loss to individual families and communities who become 
separated from individual migrants.  While ‘economic’ migrants may choose to move away 
from these important social ties, these choices are made as a result of complex pressures 
(see below). 
Why the Academic Brain Drain is Particularly Important 
If skilled labour in general is important, academic labour is doubly so, providing a variety of 
crucial functions: 
• Pure research. 
• Innovation. 
• The translation of research and innovation into useful or commercially exploitable ideas, 
products and organisational development. 
• Building the capacity of others through teaching but also teaching and training other key 
professionals including teachers and healthcare workers. 
Thus while the loss of all skilled labour to migration is of fundamental importance to the 
development potential of developing countries, the loss of academic labour is even more 
crucial still. 
Factors Causing the Brain Drain  
The ‘Brain Drain’ is a contentious subject and the very term has been challenged in recent 
years, with some preferring more politically neutral terms ‘Brain Exchange’ or ‘Brain 
Circulation’.  To understand the scale and impact of skilled labour migration from developing 
countries, it is necessary first to understand the factors driving it.  These can be usefully 
categorised as ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors.  Pull factors are those factors that attract skilled 
labour from developing countries and relate in the main to conditions in countries that receive 
skilled migrants.  These include: 
• Higher wages. 
• Job opportunities. 
• Relatively good working conditions. 
• Freedom from political instability or oppression. 
• The use of selective immigration policies designed to attract high skilled workers, while 
deterring others seen as less economically beneficial to receiving countries. 
In the case of academics, these are augmented by access to research funding and facilities 
and the potential to collaborate with other researchers. 
Push Factors include: 
• A lack of life chances. 
• Low living standards. 
• Political and social instability or repression. 
• A lack of opportunities to utilise skills. 
• Natural disasters and environmental or ecological deterioration. 
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A major feature of African economies and societies over the last 20 years has been the 
imposition of debt-induced structural adjustment including dramatic cuts in government 
budgets.  While development orthodoxy now places significant emphasis on social and 
institutional capacity building, structural adjustment has had a particular and lasting effect on 
the working environment of academics in Africa.  It constituted a prominent push factor in 
relation to the loss of academic labour from developing countries to other developing 
countries and from developing to developed countries. 
Factors which might offset the Impact of the Brain Drain 
While the loss of skilled professionals, and academics in particular, may be an important 
barrier to development, there are a number of factors associated with migration generally, 
and in some cases with skilled migration specifically, which may offset any negative impacts.  
These include: 
• Education inducement effects – the idea that the example of migrants and the higher pay 
or other benefits that might accrue to them (as well as potentially higher wages at home 
resulting from skill shortages) offer an incentive for others to undertake education.  However, 
while this might be the case in some circumstances, for the most part there is no lack of 
demand for education in developing countries.  Rather, what are important are institutional 
and social barriers to participation such as ill-health, inability to release time or afford user 
fees (on the demand side) and problems with provision due to lack of resources or teachers 
(on the supply side). 
• Technology and knowledge transfer – the idea that migrants will either return to their 
country of origin after a period in the receiving country during which their skills and knowledge 
were enhanced (e.g. students) or that migrants will establish networks between developed 
and developing countries for the transfer of knowledge and technology to their home country. 
However, there are limitations to these effects.  Where students (their governments or other 
sponsors) pay tuition fees the skills and knowledge transfer has been bought and thus an 
equal and opposite financial transfer has taken place.  Moreover, the evidence on the number 
of people who do return is patchy, with some suggestion in the literature that return is less 
likely for the higher skilled who find it easier to integrate in recipient countries.  In addition, 
evidence over the extent of technology and knowledge sharing networks was also scant, 
questioning the extent to which this takes place.  Finally, any transfer that does take place 
needs to be weighed against the opportunity cost that would not have been incurred if the 
migration had not taken place. 
• Remittances – the main factor cited as offsetting the Brain Drain is that migrants send large 
financial transfers back to their home country.  There is substantial evidence that this is 
indeed a major offsetting factor.  In some countries remittances are the main source of foreign 
earnings, dwarfing development assistance and research for the Department for International 
Development suggests that remittances from the UK amount to £2.3bn or 70%-80% of the 
UKs Overseas Development Assistance.  However, as important as the scale of remittances 
are the use to which it is put.  Here the evidence and theory over the importance of 
remittances becomes less clear and there are important arguments to suggest that 
remittances might also create problems unless they are more effectively channelled into 
productive and social investments in developing countries. 
Whether or not the impact of skilled labour migration is negative will depend then on a small 
number of factors (or determinants) which include whether or not the lost labour could be 
usefully employed in the home country, whether or not and how skilled migrants remit and 
what purpose remittances are put to and whether or not skilled migrants subsequently return 
or engage in knowledge and technology transfer activities. 
The Brain Drain and Africa 
Africa acts as a perfect case study for the general thesis about development, skills and the 
Brain Drain.  The continent has witnessed decades of wasted development potential and, in 
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places, suffers problems of extreme poverty and lack of both human and institutional 
capacity.  Even relatively developed African states, like Nigeria, demonstrate a lack of 
capacity to meet demand for education.  In 2000, Nigerian universities could accept only 
12% of applicants.  The loss of skilled labour and academic staff in particular is thus an acute 
problem.  Across the continent, this has been driven variously by inadequate salaries, poor 
working conditions, inadequate research and teaching facilities, the budget cuts and social 
unrest generated by structural adjustment and political repression. 
A prominent and important feature highlighted in the literature is that the success of earlier 
developmental phases – especially in the immediate post-independence phase – may have 
actually exacerbated the problem as the graduates produced during this period subsequently 
left.  This is a key issue because high skilled labour does not migrate from the poorest places 
but from those places that have achieved some level of development – enough to put in 
place a relatively strong education system.  A further key issue highlighted in the literature is 
that competition for academic labour is neither new, nor does it come solely from the 
developed world.  The literature on academic migration in Africa shows that there has been 
considerable movement of skilled professionals within Africa as well as from Africa to the 
developed world.  It also shows that relatively developed states in the continent – such as 
South Africa – have begun to wake up to the competitive logic of contemporary immigration 
policies and have begun to eschew the traditional race politics in relation to immigration in 
South Africa and pursue a more economically determined approach to attracting skilled 
labour from abroad. 
The Brain Drain and Higher Education in the UK 
The UK has for several years operated differentiated immigration policies designed to attract 
some skilled workers and recent announcements suggest that these will be strengthened.  In 
terms of the general scale of migration to work in the UK, Home Office figures show that in 
2002 119,000 people entered the UK on Work Permits. 
During the same year there were roughly 34,000 foreign nationals working as academics in 
UK higher education, about 23% of the total.  This is slightly up on 1995/6 when the 
proportion was just over 21%.  The largest group of these staff had nationalities of other EU 
states.   Chinese and Indian nationalities are also well represented as are US nationals.  
However, there is also data to show significant numbers of academic staff working in the UK 
who are nationals of some of the poorest countries in the world.  While  the numbers of staff 
working in UK higher education from developing countries are relatively small and 
insignificant in the context of the UK labour market, the effect of their loss to developing 
countries might be much more substantial because of the scarcity of skilled labour there. 
Suggestions for Policy Development 
There are several areas in which AUT/NATFHE may want to develop their response to the 
Brain Drain.  These are set out in the main report as a series of potential action points to: 
• Promote development and the reduction of poverty and inequality, with increased spending 
on education and higher education being one component in strategies to achieve this. 
• Promote the development of international protocols on recruitment, similar to those which 
already apply to the NHS with regard to the recruitment of healthcare workers from the 
developing world.  This would help to manage the negative impact on developing countries 
and to prevent disreputable recruitment practices. 
• Promote debate on compensatory mechanisms.  While preventing labour migration has 
potentially negative implications, compensation for the loss of skilled labour is one method of 
offsetting the negative effects of the loss of this labour to developing countries.  Such options 
are often associated with a migration tax and because of this are summarily dismissed.  
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However, a broader and more sophisticated approach, linked to global efforts at poverty 
reduction or debt relief, may be viable. 
• Accentuate the potentially beneficial effects of skilled labour migration, by promoting 
measures to facilitate the transfer of resources, technology and knowledge back to 
developing countries.  Many such measures could be taken up by individual higher education 
institutions and contributed to by local trade union representatives such as the facilitation of 
opportunities for return migration for those who wish to return, student and staff exchanges, 
the sharing of research findings, facilities and teaching materials, the development of HEI 
partnerships between developed and developing countries (akin to ‘twinning’), the 
development of research and disapora networks. 
• Promote and protect core labour standards, trade union rights and academic freedom in an 
international context. 
• Promote debate and awareness of the ‘Brain Drain’. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Objectives 
In December 2004 the Association of University Teachers and the College and Lecturers 
Union NATFHE jointly commissioned research to review some of the literature on ‘the Brain 
Drain’ with a specific emphasis on developing countries in Africa and on academic labour in 
the UK.  This report is the culmination of that research. 
The research project had a number of objectives: 
• To review some of the available literature on the Brain Drain. 
• To locate this in debates on international development and poverty reduction, with specific 
reference to progress toward the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals. 
• To relate the Brain Drain and development debates to approaches to economic development 
and under-development. 
• To consider the impact of the Brain Drain on Africa, with specific reference, where possible on 
the impact on higher education. 
• To consider and where possible quantify the scale of Brain Drain-type migration to the UK. 
• To suggest ways in which AUT/NATFHE might pursue work in relation to the Brain Drain as 
part of their work domestically and in solidarity with academic and education trade unions 
across the world. 
1.2 Structure of the Report 
The structure of this report is shaped by these objectives.  Chapter one considers the 
Development Context, reviewing the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals 
and the shift in emphasis that they represent toward human capital and institutional capacity 
building as part of an overall agenda of ‘poverty reduction’ in the developing world.  This 
development agenda is related to some contemporary approaches to development and 
under-development.  In particular, the contemporary focus on human capital and the role of 
education is drawn out, as is the need for skilled workers in the developing world in order to 
overcome human and institutional capacity barriers to development. The chapter concludes 
that academic labour is particularly important in this context as it provides a variety of 
functions that are vital for overcoming these barriers such as the development of human 
capital, teaching education and health professionals, innovation and through translating 
innovation into social, commercial and organisational development. 
Chapter two considers theoretical debates related to skilled labour migration and in 
particular highlights estimates of the overall Brain Drain.  It also critically reviews a series of 
‘feedback’ and mitigating factors identified in the recent literature on skilled labour migration 
which some commentators identify with changed emphasis from Brain ‘Drain’ to Brain ‘Gain’, 
‘Circulation’ and ‘Exchange’. 
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Chapter three identifies the factors affecting the impact of skilled labour migration from 
developing countries.  These include the initial reasons for migration – the so called ‘push’ 
and ‘pull’ factors -, the scale and various ways of estimating the cost of lost labour and skills. 
The chapter also considers important mitigating factors which might offset the loss of skilled 
labour such as education inducement effects, technology and skills transfer back to the 
developing country and perhaps most importantly of all the flow of financial remittances back 
to developing countries from expatriates living and working abroad.  The scale and impact of 
remittances on development is the subject of some considerable academic and policy debate 
and this issue is considered in detail. 
Chapter four briefly summarises some of the literature on skilled labour migration, with a 
particular focus on South Africa, a country that has often been associated with both aspects 
of the Brain Drain, simultaneously drawing in skilled labour from other parts of Africa and 
sending doctors, teachers and nurses in particular to the developed world and specifically to 
the UK.  However, despite this common assumption, recent academic thinking on the 
evidence suggests that while the latter is still true, the former may not be, and even that 
South Africa is a net loser of workers to other parts of Southern Africa.  In addition to South 
Africa there are also more superficial references to the effects of Brain Drain on Zimbabwe, 
Cameroon, Senegal, Nigeria, the Gambia and Ghana. 
Chapter five reviews the general scale of migration to the UK and includes a specific focus 
on the scale of foreign nationals working in higher education.  The chapter also highlights 
some potential explanatory dynamics for the scale of skilled migration to the UK such as the 
changing structure of the UK economy and changing UK migration policies. 
Chapter six considers arguments in the literature concerning policies to address the 
negative impacts of the Brain Drain.  Following an analytical model developed in this 
literature it considers policies related to the six ‘Rs’ of Reparation, Restriction, Return, 
Resourcing, Recruitment and Retention.  In doing so, it both reviews and critically analyses 
different types of policies categorised in this way. 
Chapter seven develops some suggestions for AUT/NATFHE.  These are not 
recommendations as such.  Rather, the discussion suggests different areas in which AUT 
and NATFHE may want to develop policy and suggests some action points to take these 
forward. 
1.3 Methodology and Limitations 
The research for this report was in the main part conducted over eight days in December 
2004.  Use was made of academic research databases to source literature on the Brain 
Drain.  A substantial debt is also owed to the work of Lindsay Lowell and Alan Findlay and 
associates who produced a range of useful outputs in a major research project for the 
International Labour Office, funded by the UK Department for International Development 
(DfID).  Particularly useful was an annotated bibliography developed as part of this project.  
While this proved a useful source the project is obviously limited by the resources available, 
which means that some of the suggested areas for action will require further research before 
full development. 
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2. The Development Context 
 
2.1 The Millennium Development Goals 
At the turn of the Millennium, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan produced ‘We 
the Peoples’: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century (UN, 2000) in advance of the 
Millennium Summit convened by the General Assembly to discuss the future of the UN. The 
report sketched the picture of the need for global action to ensure that the benefits of 
‘globalisation’ are spread widely: 
“There is mounting anxiety that the integrity of cultures and the sovereignty of states may be 
at stake.  Even in the most powerful countries, people wonder who is in charge, worry for their 
jobs and fear that their voices are drowned out in globalisation’s sweep.  Underlying these 
diverse expressions of concern is a single, powerful message: globalisation must mean more 
than creating bigger markets.  The economic sphere cannot be separated from the more 
complex fabric of social and political life, and sent shooting off on its own trajectory.  To 
survive and thrive, a global economy must have a more solid foundation in shared values and 
institutional practices – it must advance broader and more inclusive, social purposes.” (UN, 
2000:10). 
The report went on to identify the specific dangers presented by unmanaged globalisation, 
including institutional weaknesses at global and domestic level (9-17, 67-75), inequality 
between and within states, poverty and exclusion from integration in the global economy (19-
25), failing legitimacy (23-40, conflict and war (43-53) and environmental degradation (55-
65). 
In order to tackle these threats to international stability, Annan suggested a programme of 
action in four areas: 
• Tackling poverty with suggested targets with regard to poverty itself and also contributory 
factors such as universal primary education, halting the spread of HIV/Aids, improving slums, 
generating employment, institution building around this agenda, action on market access for 
exports from LDCs, sovereign debt cancellation and increased development assistance. The 
need for a specific focus on Sub-Saharan Africa was also emphasised. 
• Tackling war and conflict by strengthening international law and its enforcement, extending 
the remit and capacity of the UN itself. 
• Action on environmental sustainability was also suggested including the promotion and 
widespread ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, more extensive use of ‘green accounting’ in 
national accounts and support for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. 
• Reform of the UN was proposed, specifically with regard to the composition of the security 
council, increased resources, managerial reform of the Secretariat and increasing 
engagement with NGOs (77-80). 
These four areas were to be tackled by policies and initiatives broadly consistent with certain 
universally held values and principles including freedom, equity and solidarity, tolerance, 
non-violence, respect for nature and shared responsibility. 
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The September 2000 Millennium Summit endorsed action broadly consistent with this 
agenda in the form of the Millennium Declaration: 
“We believe that the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a 
positive force for all the world’s people. For while globalization offers great opportunities, at 
present its benefits are very unevenly shared, while its costs are unevenly distributed. We 
recognize that developing countries and countries with economies in transition face special 
difficulties in responding to this central challenge. Thus, only through broad and sustained 
efforts to create a shared future, based upon our common humanity in all its diversity, can 
globalization be made fully inclusive and equitable. These efforts must include policies and 
measures, at the global level, which correspond to the needs of developing countries and 
economies in transition and are formulated and implemented with their effective participation.” 
(UN, 2000a: 1). 
The declaration accepted fully the shared principles but expanded the areas for action to 
seven in number (see Box 1). While broadly consistent with the agenda set out by Secretary 
General Annan, a number of areas received additional emphasis, including arms control, 
combating terrorism and transnational crime, minimizing the civilian effect of sanctions, 
enhancing individual rights (with a focus on women and children), media freedom and a more 
detailed focus on the problems of Africa. 
Box 1: The United Nations Millenium Declaration Areas for Action 
Pre-Conference Report Millennium Declaration 
1. Free our fellow men and women from 
abject and dehumanising poverty. 
2. Free our fellow men and women from 
the scourge of war. 
3. Free our fellow men and women, 
children and grandchildren from the 
danger of living in a planet irredeemably 
spoilt by human activities. 
4. Make the United Nations a more 
effective instrument. 
1. Peace, security and disarmament 
2. Development and poverty reduction 
3. Protecting the environment 
4. Human rights, democracy and good 
governance 
5. Protecting the vulnerable 
6. Meeting the special needs of Africa 
7. Strengthening the United Nations 
United Nations (2000), We the Peoples’ The Role of the UN in the 21st Century; 
United Nations (2000a), Millennium Declaration. 
The Millennium Declaration has since received further institutionalisation in the form of the 
establishment of eight overarching Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)1 with a wide 
range of associated targets and statistical performance indicators attached to them as part of 
a policy ‘roadmap’. These MDGs have become the widely accepted barometer of progress in 
‘making globalisation work for the poor’. 
The eight MDGs cover: 
1. The eradication of extreme poverty and hunger 
2. The achievement of universal primary education 
3. The promotion of gender equality. 
                                                
1 Reflecting the further development and institutionalisation of several goals, targets and indicators 
agreed over the course of the 1990s and previously termed International Development Goals. 
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4. Reduction of child poverty. 
5. Improvement of maternal health. 
6. Combating HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases. 
7. Promoting environmental sustainability. 
8. Developing a global partnership for action. 
Attached to these eight goals are eighteen targets and forty-eight statistical indicators of 
progress (see Table 1). 
2.2 Progress on Global Poverty Reduction and Human Development  
There is widespread agreement that on current trends the MDGs will not be met (MDG 
Website; World Bank, 2004). For instance, between 1990 and 2001 the number of people 
living on less than $1 a day fell only slightly from 27.9% of the world’s population to 21.3% 
and in several regions, particularly in Africa, it rose (MDG Website). A large part of the 
existing and potential future reduction has been related to parts of South and East Asia, 
particularly in India and China (Vandemoortele, 2002: 3). The spread of HIV/Aids is also a 
major problem, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia where infection rates are set 
to rise substantially over the next five years. In total around 20 million people have already 
died from HIV/Aids related illness, a further 40 million are infected and five million more 
people are infected each year (DfID, 2004).   
The MDGs and recent thinking on poverty (for example see World Bank, 2003) highlight its 
multi-dimensional nature. However, it is also increasingly accepted that poverty, even 
absolute poverty, has a relative dimension which makes measurement against global income 
standards such as $1 or even $2 a day problematic. The level at which an individual or 
household can be defined as in poverty is thus highly contingent on social context. 
Therefore, in reality, the ‘poverty line’ changes both between places and across time as 
income and consumption for different social groups change at different rates. The $1 a day 
definition itself was simply the product of a small number of in-depth studies that are by now 
well out of date (Vandemoortele, 2002: 4-7). The point is, that even the slow progress that is 
being measured by the MDGs vastly under-estimates world poverty and over-estimates 
progress in tackling it. 
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Box 2: The Scale of Global Poverty Human Development Problems Today 
Poverty  
• More than a billion people live on less than $1 a day. In Sub-Saharan Africa, this amounts 
to more than 46% of the population.* 
• Over half the world’s population live on less than $2 a day. In Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia more than 76% live on less than $2 a day.* 
Hunger 
• Around a quarter of children in low-income countries are malnourished (as measured by 
being underweight). In South Asia, this figure rises to nearly 40% and in Sub-Saharan 
Africa to nearly 30%.** In Sub-Saharan Africa, more than 30% and in South Asia nearly 
25% of the population consume less food than is necessary to maintain an average level 
of activity.*** 
Education 
• Around 88% of the world’s primary school aged children have enrolled in primary 
education. However, these figures vastly overate actual performance because of large 
differences in the rate of enrolment, attendance, completion and educational outcomes. 
Gender Equality 
• Ratios of girls enrolled in schooling as a proportion of boys shows that across the world 
boys are still more likely to be engaged in schooling than girls, though the gap has closed 
significantly in some regions, and in Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and the 
Pacific and the Middle East and North Africa, performance is ahead of the trend rate to 
meet the MDG interim target for 2005. However, serious gender disparity remains in Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia, where performance is well below the needed trend to 
meet the MDGs.  
Child Mortality 
• The death rate for under fives in low income countries is 121 per 1,000 live births, 
compared to only 7 in high income countries such as the UK. It is estimated that 70% of 
deaths before the age of five are caused by preventable disease and malnutrition. Sub-
Saharan Africa is seriously off-track for meeting the MDG on child mortality as a result of 
conflict and the HIV/Aids crisis. 
Maternal Health 
• In developed countries the life-time risk of death during pregnancy or child-birth is around 
1 in 2800. In East Asia this rises to 1 in 840, in North Africa to 1 in 210, in Latin America 
and the Caribbean to 1 in 160, South East Asia to 1 in 140, in Western Asia to 1 in 120.  
In South Asia the risk is 1 in 46 and in Sub-Saharan Africa it is 1 in 16. 
HIV/Aids 
• In 2003 more than 98% of the 36 million adults and 2 million children with HIV/Aids lived 
in developing countries, with these heavily concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa where 
over 8% of the total population is infected. 45 million new infections are forecast before 
2010, yet prevention programmes reach less than 1 in 5 of the people in need, meaning 
that in the countries hit hardest life expectancy could fall to 30 years (DfID, 2004). 
Access to Safe Drinking Water 
• In 2000, 1.2 billion people still lacked access to safe drinking water. 
MDG Website.  * 2001 figures; ** 2000 estimates; *** 1999-2001. 
Table 1: Millennium Development Goals, Targets and Indicators 
Goals Targets Indicators 
1. Eradicate extreme 
poverty & hunger 
1. Halve between 1990 and 2015, the proportion 
of people whose income is less than one dollar a 
day. 
2. Halve between 1990 and 2015 the proportion 
of people who suffer from hunger. 
1. Proportion of people below $1 a day. 
2. Poverty gap ratio (incidence x depth of poverty). 
3. Share of poorest quintile in national consumption. 
4. Prevalence of underweight children (under 5 years of age). 
5. Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption. 
2. Achieve universal 
primary education. 
3. Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, 
boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full 
course of primary schooling. 
6. Net enrolment ratio in primary education. 
7. Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5. 
8. Literacy rate of 15-24 year olds. 
3. Promote gender 
equality and empower 
women. 
4. Eliminate gender disparity in primary and 
secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to 
all levels of education no later than 2015. 
9. Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education. 
10. Ratio of literate females to males of 15-24 year olds. 
11. Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector. 
12. Proportion of seats held by women in the national parliament. 
4. Reduce child 
mortality. 
5. Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, 
the under five mortality rate. 
13. Under five mortality rate. 
14. Infant mortality rate. 
15. Proportion of 1 year old children immunised against measles. 
5. Improve maternal 
health. 
6. Reduce by three quarters between 1990 and 
2015, the maternal mortality ratio. 
16. Maternal mortality ratio. 
17. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel. 
6. Combat HIV/Aids, 
malaria and other 
diseases. 
7. Have halted by 2015 and begin to reverse the 
spread of HIV/Aids. 
8. Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the 
incidence of malaria and other diseases. 
18. HIV prevalence among 15-24 year old pregnant women. 
19. Contraceptive prevalence rate. 
20. Number of children orphaned by HIV/Aids. 
20. Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria. 
22. Proportion of population in malaria risk areas using effective malaria prevention 
and treatment measures. 
23. Prevalence and death rates associated with TB. 
24. Proportion of TB cases detected and cured under directly observed treatment 
(short-course). 
7. Ensure 
environmental 
sustainability. 
9. Integrate the principles of sustainable 
development into country policies and 
programmes and reverse the losses of 
environmental resources. 
10. Halve by 2015 the proportion of people 
without sustainable access to safe drinking water 
25. Proportion of land area covered by forest  
26. Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area  
27. Energy use (kilograms of oil equivalent) per $1 GDP (PPP)  
28. Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita) and consumption of ozone-depleting 
chlorofluorocarbons (ODP tons)  
29. Proportion of population using solid fuels* 
30. Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source, 
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and basic sanitation. 
11. Have achieved by 2020 a significant 
improvement in the lives of at least 100 million 
slum dwellers.  
urban and rural  
31. Proportion of population with access to improved sanitation, urban and rural  
32. Proportion of households with access to secure tenure 
8. Develop a global 
partnership for 
development. 
12. Develop further an open, rule-based, 
predictable non-discriminatory trading and 
financial system. 
13. Address the special needs of the LDCs – 
includes tariffs and quota free access for LDC 
exports; enhanced programme of debt relief for 
HIPCs and cancellation official bilateral debt; 
more generous ODA for countries committed to 
poverty reduction. 
14. Address the special needs of land-locked 
countries and small island developing states 
(through the programme of action on sustainable 
development of small island developing states 
and the outcome of the 22nd Special Session of 
the General Assembly). 
15. Deal comprehensively with the debt problems 
of developing countries through national and 
international measures in order to make debt 
sustainable in the long-term. 
16. In cooperation with developing countries, 
develop and implement strategies for decent and 
productive work for youth. 
17. In cooperation with pharmaceutical 
companies provide access to affordable drugs for 
developing countries. 
18. In cooperation with the private sector, make 
available the benefits of new technologies, 
especially information and communications. 
Official development assistance 
33. Net ODA total and to the least developed countries, as a percentage of 
OECD/DAC donors' gross national income. 
34. Proportion of bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors for basic 
social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water, and 
sanitation). 
35. Proportion of bilateral official development assistance ODA of OECD/DAC 
donors  that is untied. 
36. ODA received in landlocked countries as proportion of their gross national 
incomes. 
37. ODA received in small island developing states as proportion of their gross 
national incomes. 
Market access  
38. Proportion of total developed country imports (by value and excluding arms) from 
developing countries and from least developed countries, admitted free of duty. 
39. Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on agricultural products and 
textiles and clothing from developing countries  
40. Agricultural support estimate for OECD countries as a percentage of their gross 
domestic product  
41. Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity   
Debt sustainability  
42. Total number of countries that have reached their HIPC decision points and 
number that have reached their HIPC completion points (cumulative)  
43. Debt relief committed under HIPC initiative  
44. Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services  
Other  
45. Unemployment rate of 15- to 24-year-olds, male and female and total  e 
46. Proportion of population with access to affordable, essential drugs on a 
sustainable basis f  
47. Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 100 population  
48a.Personal computers in use per 100 population   
48b.Internet users per 100 population 
United Nations (2001; 2003). 
2.3 Reaching the Goals: Growth, Distribution and Skills Mobility 
Meeting the MDGs will require a substantial increase in the growth rates of many developing 
countries. More important still, is that the shares of that growth, and indeed existing wealth, 
are retained by or redistributed to the poorest sections of society in these countries. Theories 
of growth and the beneficiaries of it are complex but most award at least some significance to 
education, skills and the capacity to produce innovation and skills growth. 
A number of theoretical approaches have been used to explain why some states have failed 
to achieve growth, prosperity and a reasonably equal internal distribution of the benefits of 
growth in the global economy. 
The 1960s and 1970s saw the rise of theories of dependency and neo-colonialism emerging 
from Latin America and Africa, which had a marked impact on the political ideologies of many 
less-developed countries and on forums focused on collective strategic development such as 
the Group of 77 and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
(Hoogvelt 2001). Dependency theories in their original manifestations were critical of 
continuing unequal power relationships between developed and newly independent states. 
They focused on the dependence of these countries on capital investment from and access 
to markets in the developed world and the price paid in developed country markets for 
primary commodities. Dependency theories also noted the reliance of less developed country 
economies on skills, technology and technical know-how which were retained in core 
countries in the global economy and later in Transnational Corporations (Villamil 1977, Dos 
Santos 1970). Such structural analyses led to the characterisation of post colonial 
experiences as the ‘development of underdevelopment’ (Frank 1969) and ‘dependent 
development’ (Cardoso 1972). 
Dependency ideas shaped early analyses of the impact of high-skilled labour migration. A 
more modern definition of dependency would consider the relative dependence of developing 
countries’ capacity to innovate and create skills domestically, under conditions fully 
accountable to domestic populations. For instance, one of the benefits which is often 
attributed to attracting Foreign Direct Investment is that this will create technology and 
knowledge transfer to host economies, thereby contributing to overcoming dependence over 
the longer-term. However, one of the main determinants of whether these positive effects 
take place is the absorptive capacity of the existing business and skills stock. Where the host 
economy is characterised by low skills, for instance, it is unlikely that technology and 
knowledge transfer will take place (Girma and Gorg, 2002). Further, if these benefits are to 
be transferred in a relatively equitable fashion, then higher level skills would need to be 
broad based to prevent economic benefits being absorbed only by elite domestic firms 
operating in tandem with a separate FDI economy. The loss of high skilled labour, especially 
where produced through publicly financed education, would fit within the general schema of 
capital (in this case human capital) transfers to developed countries.  As such, the Brain 
Drain might be seen as the latest phase in neo-colonialism.  Where previous phases of neo-
colonialism have centred on the unequal exchange of raw materials and manufactured goods 
between developed and developing countries, so the latest phase includes the unequal 
transfer of the prized resource of the modern economy – skilled labour. 
While dependency theories were highly influential in shaping developmental strategies and 
calls for reform by developing countries in the mid 1970s they are less popular today and 
were never fully accepted inside the major multilateral development institutions2. These 
institutions have tended to rely on neo-classical economics, at least since the mid 1970s. 
                                                
2 Except in some enclave special agencies of the United Nations such as the UNCTAD and ECLA 
which were dominated in the 1960s and 70s by the rhetoric of dependency, even if this was not always 
accompanied by substantive policy commitments. 
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Early neo-classical writings on high-skilled migration from developing countries, largely by 
Bhagwati and associates, posited a neutral effect owing to the loss only of earnings accruing 
to a single individual (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1973). A small number of skilled migrants 
might improve the welfare effects for those remaining (Grubel and Scott, 1966; 1966a), by for 
instance generating a premium on wages resulting from a shortage of labour. Other analyses 
(Lewis, 1954) have stressed that while the loss of skills is an important factor for 
development potential, this is so only insofar as these skills can be absorbed and put to use 
by the sending economy. If, for instance, high-skilled migration is as a result of high 
unemployment for high-skilled workers, then there is zero or little opportunity cost associated 
with their loss to the sending economy. 
However, as with all neo-classical economics, this work relies heavily on reductionist 
analytical models and stresses that the “…presence of distortions would invalidate this 
proposition” (Miyagiwa, 1991: 743). Other potential negative effects include an inflationary 
pressure on wages as a result of reductions in the supply of specific skills, emulation effects 
and efforts to retain skilled labour (Bagwhati and Hamada, 1973). The loss of human capital, 
and the positive technical and financial externalities that are created by it, is thus a welfare 
loss to the sending economy. Miyagiwa (1991) argues that increasing returns to education 
and higher productivity will induce high skilled migration from LDCs and that this will have 
negative effects for non-emigrants in the LDC. 
New Growth theories stress the limitations of neo-classical growth theories.  For instance, in 
endogenous growth theory, internal innovation and technological change is argued to have 
the capacity to generate constantly increasing returns to investment.3 Skills are separated 
from knowledge in that the former are privatised and individualised whereas the latter are 
socialised and relatively generally available. The challenge for development then is having 
sufficient skills available to take up generalisable knowledge about products and ways of 
producing them (Romer, 1986): 
“the use of skills makes a transformation of knowledge into products and services possible.” 
(Straubhaar, 2000: 16). 
Within the umbrella of new growth theories, several studies have developed empirical 
analyses which suggest that growth rates correlate with rates of schooling across countries 
(Mountford, 1997: 2). Further, these new growth theories emphasise also that skills spill-
overs occur where there are spatial concentrations of high skills and innovation, such as 
promoted by Harvard Business School Professor Michael Porter, doyen of cluster theory, 
which shapes regional economic development in many advanced industrial economies 
(Porter and Ketels, 2003).   
The message conveyed by new growth theories actually re-emphasises notions of 
dependency and unequal development first because there is no in-built tendency toward 
convergence between countries and second because the absence of this tendency is 
underlined by concentrations of skills which accentuate existing inequalities in potential for 
innovation and growth. This is especially so where skilled labour produced in or financed by 
developing countries, at great expense, then subsequently migrates (Straubhaar. 2000). 
Finally, because human capital development in the form of skills is so important as a 
transmission belt to turn general knowledge into production (Romer, 1990: s75-77), “…if the 
stock of human capital is too low, growth may not take place at all” (Romer, 1990: s73). 
According to most theories of growth, then, high-skilled labour migration will affect the 
potential for growth, principally because of the loss of human capital, impacting both directly 
in terms of the loss of their output (or surpluses from their output) and indirectly through the 
                                                
3 This is in contrast to most classical and neo-classical theories of growth which tend to assume 
decreasing returns and convergence between economies over time. 
Brain Drain and Higher Education In the UK and Africa 
AUT and NATFHE 22 
loss of their multiplier effects in the economy or more indirectly still because of the loss of 
their capacity to generate additional human capital accumulation (as in the case of teachers, 
educators, healthcare professionals, organisational experts etc). 
However, in practice these theoretical effects are highly contingent on a wide range of 
additional determining factors including the type of labour and skills involved and the capacity 
of the sender economy to put them to good use.  For instance Darko (2002) argues that 
much of the debate on the brain drain is simplistic and were the high-skilled diaspora to be 
immediately reversed, the incoming skills could not easily be absorbed.  The same argument 
has been made by President Obasanjo of Nigeria in the past (Udogu, 2004). 
Nevertheless approaches to economic growth throughout the world are increasingly shaped 
by the drive to increase human capital.  This involves both education and training 
interventions and also attempts to lure high skilled workers from overseas.  For instance, an 
EU conference in the Hague at the end of 2004 emphasised the EU’s need to enhance the 
mobility of skilled workers, particularly research staff, into the EU from elsewhere in the 
world, and measures such as the Marie Curie initiative aim to strengthen the European 
Research Area by attracting EU researchers working abroad back to the EU (European 
Commission, 2002). 
The UK has recently announced measures to “to ensure that only those who benefit Britain 
can come here to work or study; to strengthen the UK’s borders; to crack down on abuse and 
illegal immigration; and increase removals” (Home Office, 2005).  The new system is to be 
based on a points system with applications for immigration placed in four categories: “highly 
skilled, skilled, low skilled and student/specialist” with an independent labour market advisory 
group established to make recommendations on the existence of skills gaps, to ensure that 
immigration policies serve the needs of the UK economy.  In his foreword to the new strategy 
the Prime Minister underlined this point: 
“Our vital public services depend upon skilled staff from overseas. Far from being a burden on 
these services, our expanding NHS, for example, would have difficulty meeting the needs of 
patients without foreign-born nurses and doctors. The expertise of IT and finance 
professionals from India, the USA and the EU help maintain London as the financial centre of 
the world. Managed migration is not just good for this country. It is essential for our continued 
prosperity.” Tony Blair, February 2004 (Home Office, 2005a). 
Canada has adopted similar policies with aggressive recruitment from the rest of the world in 
response to the Brain Drain of high skilled workers from Canada to the United States 
(DeVoretz, 1999; Crush, 2002).  Davenport (2004) notes the adoption of a ‘talent initiative’ in 
New Zealand to encourage skilled immigration and alterations to the existing points system 
to facilitate this. McLaughlan and Salt (2002) demonstrate the adoption of policies to attract 
skilled labour in the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, France, Australia, UK, Canada and 
the United States.  While the majority of these policies are based around easing entry 
through regulatory reform or the adoption of express visa or points systems which 
differentiate between needed skills and others, they do note the adoption of tax incentives in 
Denmark and the Netherlands. 
Writing about South Africa, Bhorat et al. (2001) point to the gradual adoption of differentiated 
immigration policies toward skilled and unskilled workers, with a relaxation on conditions of 
entry for the former group and suggestions of lower taxation on skilled labour to provide 
incentives for immigration.  Lowell notes that several other countries (Malaysia, Canada) 
have offered tax incentives to lure their own nationals to return (2001a).  Bhorat et al. also 
highlight the salary premium attracted by skilled workers as employers attempt to attract and 
retain them.  South Africa has also adopted a points-based system similar to that recently 
introduced in the UK.  The drive of these policies is to enable entry of those bringing financial 
or human capital (RSA Department of Home Affairs, 1997; RSA Task Team on International 
Migration, 1999). More recently still the government in South Africa enacted legislation so 
that the legal framework for immigration ensures: 
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“economic growth is promoted through the employment of needed foreign labour, foreign 
investment is facilitated, the entry of exceptionally skilled or qualified people is enabled, 
skilled human resources are increased, academic exchanges within the Southern African 
Development Community is facilitated and tourism is promoted” (RSA Department of Home 
Affairs, 2004). 
The popularity of measures to attract and retain skills suggests a number of important 
potential future trends.  First, is a notable conceptual change that reduces workers to human 
capital inputs.  Second, as the trend in increasing policy measures to attract skilled workers 
suggests, is the possibility of the extension of the type of policies used toward FDI to skilled 
workers.  In the 1970s and 80s increasing capital mobility, enabled by technological and 
organisational change and regulatory reform, encouraged states to compete in ‘a race to the 
bottom’ in terms of labour rights, taxation and regulation to attract scarce and mobile financial 
capital.  In the early part of this century skills formation is increasingly seen as the key 
explanatory variable effecting rates of growth and labour productivity.  As such there may be 
potential for similar competitive policies applied toward workers with particular types of skills.  
Crush (2002) notes the international dynamics of this with one country after another targeting 
the skilled workers of a second country after witnessing the loss of its own skilled labour to a 
third.  The clear implication of such measures, would be increasingly hierarchical global 
labour markets in which the skilled have increasing options for mobility while those with skills 
perceived as abundant or redundant are constrained (Davenport, 2004: 618).  Domestic 
labour markets may also be pressured toward hierarchical differentiation in this way with the 
potential for exit among the high-skilled leading to a skewing of the tax burden to lower 
earners and the potential for rising (and multiple) inequality in incomes, access to resources 
and domestic goods and services within states. It also raises questions about long-term 
developmental consequences and inequality between states, given that in a situation of 
general scarcity, not all countries will have the resources available to attract skilled workers.  
Given the multiple factors that ‘push’ and ‘pull’ migrants, the evidence suggests that skills 
mobility will replicate existing patterns of economic growth, creating deeper divisions 
between rich and poor states. 
2.4 Education, Investment and Economic Growth 
New growth theory and its emphasis on the underlying conditions which support the 
investment environment, particularly education, have been increasingly influential in shaping 
the development policy environment:  
“Improving the investment climate goes hand in hand with enhancing human capital. A skilled 
workforce is essential for firms to adopt new and more productive technologies, and a better 
investment climate raises the returns to investing in education.” (World Bank, 2004a:11). 
Against a background analysis of the impact of the knowledge economy on development, the 
World Bank has argued that flexible education systems are needed to facilitate life-long-
learning, technological and knowledge dissemination, innovation and, through this, 
increasing productivity. Specifically the Bank argues that a literacy rate of about 40% is 
sufficient to begin the process of opening up to technology transfer in the form of FDI flows.  
The Bank claims that Intel’s 1996 decision to locate in Costa Rica was due not only to its 
overall investment environment (i.e. political stability, property rights etc) but to the quality of 
its education system (World Bank, 2003b:5).  Education is also cited as responsible for 
additional benefits such as lower crime rates and social cohesion (World Bank, 2003b:7-8). 
However, skills alone are not enough to facilitate the social transformation necessary for high 
productivity growth. Additional measures to allow flexible adjustment to change are required 
such as lifelong learning and social risk management systems to prevent labour from 
reverting to subsistence work while structural adjustment occurs. 
Table 2: Education and Human Development, Selected Countries/Indicators (2002) 
Rank Country Public 
Expenditure on 
Education % of 
GDP
Life Expectancy 
at Birth in 
Years1 (2002)
Adult 
Literacy % 
of ages 15 
and above2 
(2002)
Combined 
Gross 
Enrolment 
Ratio %3 
(2002)
Education 
Index
Human 
Development Index 
(2002)
1 Norway 6.8 78.9 .. 98 0.99 0.956
8 US 5.6 77 .. 92 0.97 0.939
12 UK 4.6 78.1 .. 113 0.99 0.936
119 South Africa 5.7 48.8 86 77 0.83 0.666
131 Ghana 4.1 57.8 73.8 46 0.65 0.568
147 Zimbabwe 10.4 33.9 90 58 0.79 0.491
151 Nigeria n/a 51.6 66.8 45 0.59 0.466
157 Senegal 3.2 52.7 39.3 38 0.39 0.437
169 Central African 
Republic 
n/a 39.8 48.6 31 0.43 0.361
177 Sierra Leone n/a 34.3 36 45 0.39 0.273
UNDP (2004).  See Appendix for notes. 
In this model, the Bank warns that education supply is not enough to achieve the necessary 
structural alterations to make liberalisation successful and to engender growth. In addition, 
then, governments must incentivise learning by appealing to individual aspirations and 
inequality: 
“The productivity of schooling may be much lower in countries where the government does 
not promote an environment favorable to the creation of higher-paying jobs and a significant 
number of educated workers work in the public sector…Policies that artificially compress 
wage differentials also reduce the returns to post-schooling investment. This is particularly 
true in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa, less so in Latin America and 
Asia.” (World Bank, 2003b: 6). 
The trick therefore, learning the lessons of the shift to service sector growth in developed 
countries, is to match the supply of education and skills to increasing demand for skilled 
labour from FDI and social policies that allow some degree of wage inequality to incentivise 
labour supply. 
“The rise in earnings inequality can be explained by changes in technology, the production 
process, work organization, and patterns of international trade. Changes in the production 
process led to changes in the demand for certain types of labor. Organizational and 
technological changes may have caused the shift in demand to dominate the shift in supply, 
leading to a rise in returns to schooling and increased earnings inequality in advanced 
economies and some middle-income countries.” (World Bank, 2003c: 12). 
The Bank also notes that the continuation of social adjustment requires higher level 
education and needs to be accessible to women as well as men, posing this as a crucial 
determinant of the skills development of succeeding generations (World Bank, 2003c: 15). 
The outline for the 2006 World Development Report (World Bank, 2004b) highlights the focus 
on gender equality, education and income/expenditure inequality throughout the 
development process. 
2.5 From Economic Development to Poverty Reduction and Increasing 
Migration 
Theories of economic growth typically focus on the direct economic effects of variables and 
are constructed inside rigid models. As development orthodoxy increasingly notes, economic 
effects of changes to an economy need to be augmented by social and institutional factors 
(Stiglitz, 1998; 2001). As such, increasing emphasis is placed on the importance of 
institutional reforms which build human capital, such as in the World Bank-led Poverty 
Reduction Strategy approach.   
Formal education provides a vital mechanism not only to increase the capacity and 
productivity of labour but also to secure the social values necessary for development, helping 
to prevent a return to traditional and subsistence systems: 
“Education triggers a series of benefits: it is key to creating, applying and spreading new ideas 
and technologies which in turn are critical to high sustained growth; it augments cognitive and 
other skills, which in turn augment the productivity of labor; better educated women are more 
effective in household production of children’s good health and schooling. In addition, 
education is the ultimate liberator, empowering individuals to make personal and social 
choices.” (World Bank, 2002: 6). 
The PRSP Sourcebook also focuses on the role of education in achieving social adjustment: 
“A large body of research points to the catalytic role of basic education for those individuals in 
society who are most likely to be poor—that is, girls, ethnic minorities, orphans, people with 
disabilities, and people living in rural areas. Basic education or literacy training, of adequate 
quality, is crucial to equipping disadvantaged individuals with the means to contribute to and 
benefit from economic growth. Education is one of the most powerful instruments societies 
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have for reducing deprivation and vulnerability: it helps lift earnings potential, expands labor 
mobility, promotes the health of parents and children, reduces fertility and child mortality, and 
affords the disadvantaged a voice in society and the political system. 
Education investments are also crucial for the sustained economic growth that low-income 
countries are seeking to stimulate, and without which long-term poverty reduction is 
impossible. Education directly contributes to worker productivity, and can promote better 
natural resource management and more rapid technological adaptation and innovation. It is 
fundamental to the creation of a competitive, knowledge-based economy, not only for the 
direct production of the critical mass of scientists and skilled workers that every country 
requires—no matter how small or poor—but also because broad-based education is 
associated with faster diffusion of information within the economy, which is crucial for enabling 
workers and citizens in both the traditional and modern sectors to increase productivity.” (Aoki 
et al., 2003: 233-4). 
The importance of education in securing this developmental trajectory led the Bank to 
suggest a shift in the Education For All target toward completion of a defined amount of 
primary education, set at six years because of statistical analysis that suggests this is point 
at which the benefits of education become embedded. The Bank has also identified major 
barriers to achieving this, such as weaknesses in data, policy, institutional capacity and 
financing alongside contextual dynamics such as HIV/Aids, conflict (and post-conflict) and 
the use of user-fees (World Bank, 2002: 12-13). 
While the current debate around poverty reduction specifically targets primary education, for 
growth to take hold, secondary and tertiary education are also important: 
“The social benefits of primary education— such as lower fertility and improved health for 
mothers and children—have made universal primary education a worldwide goal. But 
developing countries cannot ignore secondary and post-secondary education, though the 
social benefits from investments at these levels are less well documented.” (UNDP, 2001: 90). 
However, if there are market and institutional failures which pose significant barriers to the 
establishment of primary education, these are even more pervasive when considering the 
secondary and tertiary level: 
“Tertiary education is expensive—too expensive for many poor countries.” (UNDP, 2001: 90). 
The response from the multilateral development institutions is to reorientate provision to 
allow the private sector to provide significant proportions of secondary and tertiary education 
(UNDP, 2001: 90).  However, without a certain level of development, market failures are 
likely to be as or more pervasive than state and institutional failures, and market incentives 
are unlikely to provide the broader role of education in fostering the continuation of the 
collective knowledge of society (see below). 
In support of this poverty reduction approach the Bank and IMF have adopted a joint 
programme of only granting concessional assistance through a small number of 
programmes. Conditions for approval include the technical credibility of the strategy and 
domestic ownership, demonstrated through support for and participation of NGOs and others 
in the production of the strategy (World Bank, 2003a). As the Bank acknowledges this clearly 
creates technical demands on the host LDC (World Bank, 2003b). 
This approach recognises that successful growth and integration into the world market 
requires that market failures be overcome, particularly with regard to freeing sufficient labour 
time from subsistence activities to engage in the formal labour market.  This can only occur 
where the poor are healthy and skilled enough to do so.  To ensure that this is the case a 
number of social and institutional practices must be in place.  The poor must be identified 
and their problems analysed, agriculture must be reformed to generate surpluses that can be 
sold, social institutions must be established, schools and clinics must be staffed, educational 
and healthcare strategies and immunization programmes developed and rolled out and 
infrastructure provided.  Moreover, the external financial assistance necessary to provide all 
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this brings with it the conditionality that well developed strategies and plans must be in place 
prior to receiving support. All of these tasks require large numbers of highly skilled 
professionals, as the recent Africa Commission report underlines: 
“Qualified professional staff are essential to all forms of development. The delivery of health, 
education and other services depends on them. They are crucial for collecting and managing 
data, and debating and developing good policies, based on the evidence of what works and 
what does not. They are essential to implementing those policies and to monitoring how they 
are put into effect. Scientifically and technically proficient staff are needed to identify 
opportunities arising from innovation and scientific discoveries and to develop effective policy 
in areas such as science, trade and resource management. Especially in the private sector, 
these particular skills are key to performance and innovation.” (Commission for Africa, 
2005:130). 
This means that the loss of high-skilled labour acts as a barrier to establishing the essential 
groundwork for development, even if there is no immediate and direct economic loss.  This 
means that where there is insufficient capacity to absorb higher level skills in directly 
productive economic activity their loss represents a barrier to the future potential for 
development. 
However, even where these social, institutional and human capital barriers to nurturing 
development can be overcome there are important further challenges, especially where 
development has been a ‘stop-go’ cyclical experience.  This is because of the important 
relationship between development and migration.  Severely under-developed – subsistence 
– economies not only lack the necessary features for development but they lack the 
conditions to facilitate migration also.  This is because migration is actually part and parcel of 
the developmental path as much as it is a response to a lack of development.  As Massey 
argues: 
“International migrants do not come from poor, isolated places that are disconnected from 
world markets, but from regions and nations that are undergoing rapid change and 
development as a result of their incorporation into global trade, information and production 
networks.  In the short run international migration does not stem from a lack of economic 
development but from development itself” (Massey, 1998: 277). 
The essential logic of Massey’s argument is that successful agricultural development – the 
replacement of subsistence agriculture with production for markets – results from increasing 
rural labour productivity.  This releases labour from agricultural production, drives 
urbanisation which, in turn, facilitates international migration, through integration in a cash 
economy, the accumulation of sufficient human (skills etc) and financial capital, access to 
transport routes and information flows about where to migrate to and how.  By definition high 
skilled labour migration is sourced from social groups that have achieved a degree of 
success within this process, having had access to a higher than average amount of 
education.  This leads to analyses of a developmental migration band, consisting not of the 
poorest countries who witness very small migrant flows4 but a middle tier of countries that 
have achieved a certain level of development sufficient to enable the needed level of 
urbanisation, education and resource accumulation (Council of the European Union, 2002).  
Above this band a further tier of more affluent countries also witness lower levels of labour 
migration because the incentive effects of higher wages abroad need to be set against the 
costs of migration, especially disruption of personal and social ties and uncertainty (Oleson, 
2003; Faini and Venturini, 1993). 
This finding has important implications for policy thinking related to migration and 
development.  By concentrating development assistance and efforts at institutional and social 
transformation on the least developed countries international migration may actually 
                                                
4 Where these flows are larger they tend to be refugee rather than migration flows. 
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increase.  Mitigating policies are therefore required to ensure that human capital loss through 
‘brain drain’ does not effect an in-built barrier or drag to development beyond a certain level, 
especially in regions like Sub-Saharan Africa (UNDESA, 2002).  For instance the costs of 
technical assistance from foreign nationals makes up a substantial part of overall 
development assistance.  At the African Regional Conference on Brain Drain in 2000 the 
Deputy Director of the UN Economic Commission for Africa cited evidence of 100,000 foreign 
nationals employed across the continent at a cost of US$4bn or 35% of all development 
assistance (Barka, 2000). 
This naturally raises the question (Olesen, 2003) of whether the international community is 
politically committed to sanction the huge transfer of resources to the developing world to 
both facilitate development and secure opportunities for high skilled and highly educated 
‘potential migrants’ to remain at home and therefore facilitating further development. 
2.6 Education, Brain Drain and Social Development 
The discussion above, following the general line of the literature on development (see above) 
and ‘brain drain’ (see below), focuses on the loss of highly educated individuals as bearers of 
skills, defined as more or less useful economic inputs.  It thus reduces the overall 
implications of migration to the cost in terms of economic growth now or in the future.  This 
was recognised in the development debate in 1990 by the UNDP whose first Human 
Development Report warned that: 
“Human development efforts in many developing countries have been severely squeezed by 
the economic crisis of the 1980s and the ensuing adjustment programmes.  Recent 
development experience is thus a powerful reminder that the expansion of output and wealth 
is only a means.  The end of development must be human well-being.  How to relate the 
means to the ultimate end should once again become the central focus of development 
analysis and planning”. (UNDP, 1990: 10). 
Following this line of argument, education is more than the provision of skills as economic 
inputs.  It is a process of re-learning the collective knowledge of society for each successive 
generation and learning from social and political mistakes.  It is thus a core mechanism in 
cultural reproduction and historical social learning and development: 
“…since culture cannot be genetically inherited, everything known has to be re-learnt by each 
new generation.  This would be true even of so called ‘primitive societies’ that anthropology 
assumed existed without history.  However, learning might also be posed in terms of how 
societies learn from historical experience; as for example how Germany and other countries 
learnt from the experience of fascism, or from the ultimate failure of the socialist experience in 
the former-Soviet Union, or the lessons we have not begun to learn in Britain from the 
experience of empire” (Ainley, 2001). 
As such, the loss of highly educated individuals is a loss of collective social knowledge 
vested by society in them.  This is important because the increased focus of benefits to 
individuals holding skills and/or knowledge that are seen as beneficial to key economic 
sectors tends to ignore the broader importance of skills and knowledge.  For instance, 
Okome (2002) argues that Africa and Africans “have a corpus of knowledge from which the 
world can learn”, but that this is not always contained within economic inputs.   
On an individual basis it is a loss to a family or a community, to personal and social ties: 
“Emigration has a social cost in the home countries that should not be underestimated.  How 
many families in the Philippines have been broken up by the mother or father leaving to go to 
work in the West?  Who is interested in the rising materialism of the relatives left behind in the 
home country when they receive money sent home by the migrant?  The consequences are 
all the more serious when the women emigrate.  For instance, in Sri Lanka, more than 
500,000 women work abroad, mainly in Gulf countries.  It is often their children who leave 
school early or who fall victim to all kinds of abuses.” (ICFTU, 2004: 3). 
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While the protection of freedom of individual choice is clearly important, it also worth noting 
that economic migration (to find work) is not a choice taken freely in an open context.  Rather 
it is a choice constrained by limited available options, all of which have significant 
consequences.  The task of development then is not just to engender growth but to create 
life chances and opportunities.  Highly educated migration is not just an economic loss but a 
social, political and individual loss. 
2.7 Academic Labour: Special Case 
The majority of the literature focuses broadly on labour migration or high skilled labour 
migration. However, academic labour is specifically important because it spans a number of 
functions that are important in the preceding discussion of economic growth, the provision of 
the necessary underlying conditions to make growth and poverty reduction possible. In the 
early post-colonial period higher education was thus crucially linked to development in the 
ideas of both modernisation and human capital theories of development.  The crucial link 
was that higher education could provide the means to inculcate a western style of social and 
political development and that it could build the necessary human capital to enable economic 
development (Agbo, 2003).  More recently, the literature on growth and development has 
highlighted the importance of the core functions of HE including pure research and 
innovation, the translation of innovation into useful or commercially exploitable ideas, 
products, organisational development and planning. Further, academic labour is important in 
building the human capital of others through teaching and more specifically still through 
teaching teachers, healthcare workers and other vital professionals who in turn can help to 
build institutional, social and human capacity for development (Oni, 2000; Teffera and 
Altbachl, 2004). Clearly the extent to which all or some of these functions are present in 
migrating labour is dependent on the extent to which individual migrants fulfil each of these 
functions. Clearly, not all academic labour will fulfil all of these functions. However, the loss 
of academic labour on aggregate tends to suggest the loss of these functions to the sender 
economy. 
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3. Factors Determining the Impact  
       of the Brain Drain on LDCs 
 
3.1 Reasons for Migration 
There are a variety of approaches to understanding the reasons for high skilled migration.  
Neo-classical economic and growth theory tend to focus on the importance of scarcity, 
choice and market relations defining supply and demand.  In this context migration is the 
product of the aggregate effects of choices of rational individuals seeking the most 
advantageous result for themselves and their families.  In developed economies rational 
actors cluster toward higher paid, higher value jobs.  This then allows foreign labour to move 
toward places of high labour demand where there are wage differentials between countries.  
The propensity for migration then is simply shaped by the potential for employment and the 
differential wage rates between countries (Massey et al., 1994).  Other factors are also 
important in allowing markets to work in this way, such as information flow to bring demand 
and supply together.  High skilled migration is simply an extension of this where scientists 
and academics from the developing world move to the developed world to take up posts that 
either cannot be filled because of a skills shortage (where markets have failed to incentivise 
domestic skill production).  Since individuals do not make rational choices in perfect market 
contexts, other factors may also shape their decisions.  For instance, labour migration may 
also be part of household strategies for diversification or coping strategies allowing 
calculations of the likelihood and potential scale of remittances to also enter the equation.  
The basic thrust of the argument, however, is that differential – segmented – markets create 
push/pull factors which shape the migration decisions of rational actors seeking to maximise 
their own position. 
Logan (2000) argues that this is simplistic and that in fact a range of complex “professional, 
institutional, cultural, economic, political and geographic”  factors shape such decisions, a 
finding also supported by Papademetriou (1991). Dzvimbo (2003) augments this list with a 
sharper emphasis on “factors such as an environment conducive to professional autonomy in 
universities, research institutes and the workplace in general; and personality, goals, and 
personal history, which accounts for individual differences”.  
Others (Dzvimbo, 2003; Dovlo, 2003; El-Khawas, 2004; Odunsi, 1996; Udogu, 2004; Council 
of the European Union, 2002) distinguish between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors.  Push factors 
include a lack of life chances, lower living standards, political and social instability or 
repression, lack of available opportunities to fruitfully utilise skills in the home country, natural 
disasters and ecological deterioration.  Relatively advantageous conditions in host countries 
act as pull factors such as higher wages, job opportunities, good working conditions and 
access to research funding, freedom from political instability or oppression.  In these latter 
instances, Harris argues that skilled migration is as much a “vote of no confidence” in sender 
countries as it is exploitation of human capital resources by firms and governments in the 
developed world (Harris, 2004).  These push factors are augmented by a combination of 
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general economic, technological and demographic change in developed economies creating 
skills gaps in specific sectors such as education, health or in innovative industries.  The 
ICFTU (2004a) report that “almost half of newly recruited nurses in the UK in 2001-2 came 
from foreign countries, such as the Philippines, India or Africa”. 
3.2 The Scale and Cost of Lost Labour and Human Capital 
A host of commentators have noted that the existence and significance of a ‘Brain Drain’ is 
difficult to quantify because of the paucity of data on international migration and the poor 
quality of the data that does exist (Carrington and Detragiache, 1998; Adams, 2003:9). This 
is a further problem for this study because data on international stocks and flows is even less 
detailed in terms of occupational status, making it virtually impossible to estimate flows and 
stocks of academic labour in the UK or even OECD. 
The OECD publishes an annual publication entitled Trends in International Migration, but this 
also does not adequately disaggregate beyond highest level of qualification, where the 
categories are primary, secondary and tertiary. Others, such as Carrington and Detragiache 
(1998) have tried to extrapolate from the OECD data to provide more detail on the 
qualifications and skills of migrants into OECD countries and their source countries but the 
data is severely limited and the methodologies (many of the problems are recognised by 
Carrington and Detragiache themselves) they use make it likely to be unreliable.  For 
instance they assume similar patterns of migration to all OECD as for the United States, yet 
migration is shaped by a range of factors including linguistic ties, existing disapora networks 
and former colonial links which make such assumptions potentially distorting.  Moreover, the 
authors themselves note that “in interpreting our numbers on the brain drain, it is important to 
recognize that some or all of the education of some migrants may have taken place in the 
United States”.  In any case they were only able to break the data down to immigrants with 
primary, secondary or tertiary education. 
Despite these problems there have been attempts to estimate the scale of high-skilled lost 
labour through migration.  For instance, the UN Economic Commission for Africa has 
suggested the following figures: 
“Africa lost 60,000 professionals (doctors, university lecturers, engineers, etc.) between 1985 
and 1990. The emigration of doctors and other experts from Africa is the most striking 
illustration of this problem. According to the 1993 UNDP Human Development Report, there 
are more than 21,000 Nigerian doctors practising in the United States alone while Nigeria’s 
health system suffers from an acute lack of medical personnel; 60 per cent of all Ghanaian 
doctors trained locally in the 1980s had left the country, while in Sudan, 17 per cent of doctors 
and dentists, 20 per cent of university lecturers, 30 per cent of engineers in 1978 alone had 
gone to work abroad.” (Barka, 2000). 
In fact, on some estimates there are more African scientists and engineers working in the US 
than there are in Africa (El-Khawas, 2004). Udogu (2004) summarises the scale of the 
problem: 
“it is estimated that in 2000, there were 92,435 Africans in New York City, and 25,776 in 
Montgomery, Alabama.  By 2003 there were 20,000 Africans in Atlanta, Georgia.  When 
figures from Los Angeles, Chicago, Miami, Dallas and Houston, Texas and elsewhere in the 
United States are added, the number of contemporary African immigrants could jump to the 
millions.  Europe also attracts some of the best and brightest African intelligentsia.  In fact, 
there are over 100,000 highly educated professionals in the US alone, of which, for the 
purpose of illustration, there are over 21,000 Nigerian physicians, not to mention the fact that 
there are more Sierra-Leonean doctors practicing in the Chicago area than in Sierra-Leone 
itself.  Arguably, these are Africans who, if they had remained in Africa, could ably assist other 
Africans in engendering economic take-off in the continent.  The contributions of Africa’s 
immigrant intelligentsia to development in the region would probably have been so 
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phenomenal that the current clamor about Africa’s marginalization and underdevelopment 
would not have reached its present crescendo.” 
Extrapolating from US data on research active scientists and engineers, Meyer and Brown 
(1999) argue that  
“A realistic estimation of the S&E [scientists and engineers] originally from a developing 
country and involved today specifically in R&D activities in the U.S.A. is about 170,000…the 
number of S&E originally from a developing country and working in R&D in the "triad" [US, EU 
and Japan] would be close to 400.000 people. In comparison, the total – home based – R&D 
personnel for all developing countries amount to 1,224,000 S&E. One must not forget that the 
"triad" does not include countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Switzerland, 
among others, which are also well known for their high rates of highly skilled foreigners. 
Therefore, to assume that the R&D workforce originally from developing countries and 
currently employed in highly industrialized countries represents one third of the home-based 
one, is a reasonable and rather low, hypothesis.” 
However, the volume of labour is only one determinant of output.  Equally important is labour 
productivity.  Following this line of argument, Meyer and Brown (1999) argue that differential 
access to resources, infrastructure and technology means that the intellectual diaspora is 
also relatively more productive than those who remain in the developing countries, and 
significantly so: 
“The expatriate scientists and engineers to whom it is referred here work in an environment 
which is far better than the one of their peers in the country of origin. They indeed have 
access to funding, technical support, equipment, scientific networks, experimental conditions, 
and many other resources which are much more limited at home. The productivity of the 
"triad" R&D sector is, for instance, 4.5 times higher in terms of publications and 10 times 
higher in terms of patents than it is in the same sector for the developing world.” 
In trying to quantify the lost investment in human development the United Nations 
Development Programme have quantified the loss of IT professionals from India to the US 
alone over a three year period at around $6bn: 
“Consider just the public spending on students graduating from India’s elite institutes of 
technology. Operating costs per student run about $2,000 a year, or about $8,000 for a four-
year programme. Adding in spending on fixed capital, based on the replacement costs of 
physical facilities, brings the total cost of training each student to $15,000–20,000. Multiply 
that by 100,000, the number of professionals expected to leave India each year for the next 
three years. At the high end, it brings the resource loss to $2 billion a year.” (UNDP, 2001: 
92). 
A similar analysis for South Africa estimates that the migration of graduates was lowering 
GDP by 0.37% and cost 67.8bn Rand in lost investments in human capital during 1997.  
Added to this is the loss of real financial assets which move with their owners.  The same 
authors estimate that the loss to South Africa represented a further 11bn Rand in the period 
1994-1997.  Finally, they highlight the wage inflation and recruitment effects left behind as 
costing around 2.5bn Rand per year and also the assumed lower labour productivity that 
results from human capital loss (Kaplan, Meyer and Brown, 1999). 
3.3 Lost Labour and Mitigating Factors 
A major recent project managed by Professor Alan Findlay for the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and funded by the UK Department for International Development (DfID) 
considered the impact of ‘skilled labour migration from developing countries’. Lowell and 
Findlay (2001), summarising the projects’ findings for potential economic development find 
that while the overall effect of high skilled migration from LDCs is likely to have negative 
impacts on their potential for economic growth there are a number of mitigating or offsetting 
factors such as education inducement effects and ‘feedback’ effects such as return 
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migration, technology transfer and foreign exchange remittance.  Where these factors prove 
significant, and especially where migration is temporary, there is some debate in the 
literature over whether notions of ‘brain drain’ and ‘brain gain’ should be replaced with brain 
‘circulation’ or exchange (Lowell and Findlay, 2001; Hatekenaka, 2004). 
Education Inducement Effects 
A small amount of skilled migration may have the effect of stimulating domestic education by 
highlighting incentives in the form of higher wage returns to education. This finding is 
supported by Mountford (1997) who argues that in very specific circumstances the potential 
for a small amount of emigration will induce higher enrolments in education because of the 
domestic wage inflation effects demonstrated by Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) and because 
of the possibility of migration. However, Mountford’s analysis is derived from an analytical 
model which assumes that education supply is available. Nowhere in his analysis does he 
consider how the operation of his model would be effected by chronic poverty, ill-health, 
conflict or weak institutions effecting both the supply of education and the capacity of the 
majority of the population to access it. Neither does he consider the potential role of skills lost 
to migration in mitigating each of these factors. 
Technology Transfer 
Findlay and Lowell emphasise the importance of skills and technical know-how and the 
potential for short-term migration to enhance these.  For when students study abroad they 
may return with enhanced skills, effecting a knowledge and skills transfer (Lowell and 
Findlay, 2001). 
Specific situations where migrants may return to their host country are where there is a rapid 
improvement in the quality of governance or in development in the sender country.  
Contemporary examples might include Chile after the fall of Pinochet, Spain after the death 
of Franco and Afghanistan after the deposition of the Taliban regime (Oleson, 2003).   
However, the data on migration does not adequately quantify what proportion of migrants 
subsequently return. The empirical country case studies from the DfID/ILO project suggest 
that those emigrants who do return, tend to be the lower skilled, rather than the highly 
educated who find it easier to integrate into the host economy (Alburo and Abella, 2001; 
Verhaal, 2001). There is little data to show whether or not high skilled emigrants return with 
higher skills.  What information is available with regard to students abroad suggests a high 
proportion of ‘leakage’ to the recipient economy with “only half of the foreign students 
receiving a doctorate or a post-doctorate in the latter return to their native country within two 
years” (Meyer and Brown, 1999). 
The second, feedback effect - technology transfer - from ex-patriots abroad could also be of 
significant benefit to sender economies (Lowell, 2001: 22). Many countries have tried to 
facilitate such transfers through more or less formal networks and organisations such as the 
South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) (Bhorat et al., 2002) and similar projects in 
both Uruguay and Argentina (Pellegrino, 2002).  Lowell (2001) also notes that there are a 
large and growing number of informal and autonomously organised academic networks of 
this nature, although there is no evaluation of their developmental impact. However, the 
extent to which such alliances are useful will depend on the capacity of sender LDCs to 
absorb transfers. This is also the case with regard to technology transfer from FDI (Girma 
and Gorg, 2002). 
Remittances 
The most often cited ‘feedback’ effect is that of remittances from migrants working abroad. 
For many countries such remittances are a major source of foreign exchange (Adams, 2003: 
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4). Findlay and Lowell claim that “most international migrants choose to migrate with the 
intention of sending part of their earnings back to the country of origin to help support their 
immediate or extended family” (2001: 9).  The World Bank (2003) has estimated that these 
flows are significant, being the second most important source of foreign currency for 
developing countries and exceeding aid flows.  Adams (2003: 4-6) has used IMF Balance of 
Payments data to estimate ‘official’ flows of remittances for 24 developing countries. This 
analysis showed that among the 24 countries in the study, India (US$7.994 billion), Mexico 
(US$5.816 billion) and Turkey (US$4.035 billion) received the largest remittances. Data for 
LDCs in the sample were also significant. Adams also cites unpublished IMF research that 
suggests total informal remittance flows are also substantial at an estimated US$10bn 
annually, though this figure is substantially below estimations for earlier periods (US$35bn), 
with the change attributed to the decline in black market exchange premiums in many 
countries over the last decade. Puri and Ritzema (1999) estimated the scale of unofficial 
remittance flows to a number of countries and concluded that the proportion of unofficial to 
official remittances varied from as low as 8% to as high as 85%. 
Other estimates have suggested that the scale of remittances is much larger than this.  For 
instance, Abella (1991) estimated nearly fifteen years ago that to replace the capital inflow of 
remittances to five Asian labour sending countries would require US$55bn of alternative 
flows.  To put this in perspective, FDI inflows to these countries at that time were around 
$5bn (Oleson, 2003).  Gemmeltoft (2003) has suggested that total migrants remittances, 
even on the cautious ‘official’ data, exceed US$100bn though some of this is to developed 
countries and some of it is between developing countries.  His analysis suggests that it is 
middle-income countries that benefit the most from remittances, but that they make up a 
substantial proportion of income for low-income countries.  Significantly, he claims that the 
volume of remittances exceeds aid flows for all developing countries, though this is not the 
case for the poorest most aid dependant states.  These findings would offer some support to 
the arguments raised above about the relationship between migration and development.  
Gemmeltoft’s more detailed country data shows that Lesotho is the most remittance 
dependent nation with these inflows making up 37% of GDP.  Other remittance dependent 
states include Jordan (21%), Somoa (21%), Yemen (18%) and Cape Verde (18%).  
Regionally, his data shows that remittances are highest as a proportion of national income in 
the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa.  Table 3 shows Gemmeltoft’s estimations of the 
relative scale of remittance flows to the largest receiving DCs. 
Taylor (1999) finds that total world remittances for 1995 amounted to more than $1trillion with 
a third of this figure being worker remittances and a further quarter being salary payments.5  
However, like Adams, Taylor also finds that the data reveals that remittances are unequal 
between different sender states. For instance, in Cape Verde remittances represented 16 
times the value of other exports in 1994, a pattern he cites as familiar in developing island 
states. He also cites the value of remittances for the Dominican Republic as being in excess 
of exports, while being 75% of exports in Egypt, El Salvador and Jordan. He argues that 
remittance behaviour will be determined by a range of factors including economic and 
savings policies in host and sender countries, exchange rates, payment facilities and their 
marginal cost (1999: 68-9). 
 
                                                
5 Taylor also notes that these two categories are used interchangeably by many developing countries 
when recording remittances, meaning that they should be taken together in analysis. 
Table 3: Gemmeltoft's Estimation of Relative Scale of Remittance Flows to Largest Receiving Developing Countries (1995-1999, Total) 
Total Remittances Remittances per US$ aid Remittances/GDP Remittances per capita 
Country US$m Country US$ Country % Country US$ 
India 45.9 Turkey 39.3 Lesotho 37 Antigua and Barbuda 3,997 
Phillipines 29.1 Mexico 33.9 Jordan 21 Jordan 1,714 
Mexico 28 Costa Rica 23.9 Samoa 21 Jamaica 1,393 
Turkey 21 Jamaica 15.4 Yemen 18 Samoa 1,305 
Egypt 16.6 Barbados 14.7 Cape Verde 18 Barbados 1,212 
Morocco 10 Dominican Republic 9.8 Albania 16 Cape Verde 1,105 
Brazil 9.3 Croatia 9.3 Jamaica 13 Grenada 1,071 
Thailand 8 Phillipines 7.8 El Salvador 11 El Salvador 1,027 
Pakistan 7.8 Antigua and Barbuda 6.9 Georgia 10 Lesotho 863 
Jordan 7.7 Nigeria 6.8 Antigua and Barbuda 9 Dominica 771 
Bangladesh 7.5 Brazil 6.5 Nicaragua 8 Dominican Republic 738 
China 7.5 India 5.5 Dominican Republic 8 St Lucia 708 
Nigeria 6.5 El Salvador 4.9 Philippines 8 St Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
689 
El Salvador 6.1 Tunisia 4.6 Grenada 7 Albania 662 
Dominican Republic 6 Lesotho 4.3 Sri Lanka 6 Croatia 640 
Gemmeltoft (2003: 189).  
While the size of remittance flows is interesting and significant, the more important question 
relates to their impact on development. On the one hand they may filter into the domestic 
economy producing multiplier effects or on the other they may enhance import dependency, 
drive inflation and where they accumulate in the hands of already wealthy families may also 
increase inequality in the sender country. 
Djajic (1986) notes that remittances can be beneficial for remaining residents if the scale of 
remittances (or indeed expenditure of migrants on return visits) is of sufficient scale to leave 
the capital-labour ratio unchanged.  Quibra (1997) concurs but goes further to note that the 
type of emigration will determine the impact of remittances on the domestic income 
distribution. 
Work by Stark (1984), Stark and Lucas (1988), Stark and Taylor (1989; 1991) and Stark, 
Taylor and Yitzahki (1991) suggests that the inducement to migrate is partly driven by the 
potential for remittances as a result of a desire to enhance a family or household’s relative 
economic position within a defined community. Taylor’s later work (1999) goes beyond this, 
suggesting that migration is not an individualised act but a conscious economic strategy on 
the part of households, extended families and wider communities. In this work, migration is 
not so much driven by relative deprivation but is induced by the lack of ability to absorb skills 
and productive endeavour in the sender locality and the possibility of higher earnings 
elsewhere. In either case, remittances are part of the plan and, despite social, economic and 
institutional barriers (which were part of the reason for migration in the first place) 
remittances can, over time, help to provide sufficient insulation from risks (droughts, floods, 
crop failures etc) to enable investment, particularly in rural production. In Taylor’s (1999) 
model, remittances may be part of a self-organised strategy leading to the generation of 
surpluses for sale and the partial release of agricultural labour from subsistence work to the 
cash economy.  Reviewing a substantial amount of empirical literature, he contends that 
contrary to expectations, remittances can be, and in many places are, an important source of 
finance for indigenous development and further human development (for instance school 
fees). 
The limitations of Taylor’s approach, however, are explicitly noted in the way that his 
argument is constructed. First he concludes that the capacity of sender units (households, 
families or communities) to absorb remittances is low, given that this was the initial reason 
for migration, thus hindering the multiplier effects that can be derived from them. He cites a 
variety of multiplier figures, which in the early period are almost entirely below the value of 
the transfer, though the situation is reversed with a given level of development. Second, the 
beneficial impacts he posits are also dependent on the foundation of his argument: that 
migration was in the first place a coherent and conscious strategy for development in the 
sender area rather than a mere bid for alternative subsistence. Third, Taylor’s theoretical 
argument, drawn from his own earlier work and that of associates (e.g. Stark and Yitzahki), 
and evidence largely relate to rural sender contexts and he notes that evidence suggests that 
the multiplier impact of remittances to urban areas is less significant because urban 
recipients are more likely to use them to purchase imports (partly because of increased 
access to these markets). 
This limitation is more important still because as already argued above, international migrant 
labour, and especially high skilled labour is much more likely to come from urban areas 
(Lowell and Findlay, 2001: 9; Massey, 1998; Olesen, 2003).  Additionally, high skilled labour 
may, by definition, be more likely to come from relatively affluent family/household units that 
have been able to invest in education in the past.  As such the marginal utility of the 
additional income may be less significant and more likely to be spent on luxury items and 
imports.  Some studies have suggested that this relationship between remittances and 
consumption can also generate inflation, with Korea  and Pakistan cited as examples (see 
Puri and Ritzeme, 1999). The ICFTU (2004) also note the potential for inflationary pressures 
arising from remittance-funded consumer spending, citing the example of Yélimané in Mali: 
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“Pure consumption can have perverse effects.  In Yélimané, Mali, the remittance of funds has 
caused unexpected inflation, making the city one of the most expensive places to live in Mali.  
Its inhabitants are big spenders, live in opulent villas and are pushing prices up – so much so 
that although five new schools have been created, they have been deserted by the teachers”. 
Other arguments about the potentially undesirable impact of remittances relate to 
unpredictability and the incentive that they create for developing country governments to 
encourage the migration of skills for more immediate financing of imports and social stability 
rather than facing the longer-run choice of channelling their skills and labour into 
developmental activities at home. Olesen (2003) notes the quandary posed for developing 
country governments.  An exception to these arguments is where remittances are channelled 
into productive investments or savings, thereby contributing to the development of local 
capital markets, themselves a major element in securing development in the future (see Puri 
and Ritzeme, 1999).  However, if this were both possible and efficient (i.e. more productive 
than channelling migrants’ income into savings in the host country) then it would suggest a 
certain level of development in the sender country, with properly functioning capital markets. 
Lowell and Findlay (2001) note that there is insufficient information available on remittance 
behaviour by skilled migrants and on higher earners as distinct groups. In turn Quibra (1997) 
notes the complex contextual factors which determine whether or not migration and 
remittances will be beneficial to the aggregate welfare. 
Table 4: Puri and Ritzeme's Remittance Cost/Benefit Matrix 
Benefits Costs 
Ease foreign exchange constraints and 
improve balance of payments 
Are unpredictable 
Permit imports of capital goods and raw 
materials for industrial development 
Are spent on consumer goods which 
increases demand, increases inflation 
and pushes up wage levels. 
Are potential source of savings and 
investment for capital formation and 
development 
Result in little or no investment in capital 
generating activities 
Net addition to resources High import content of consumer demand 
increases dependency on imports and 
exacerbates BOP problems 
Raise the immediate standard of living of 
recipients 
Replace other sources of income, 
thereby increasing dependency, eroding 
good work habits and heightening 
potential negative effects of return 
migration 
Improve income distribution (if 
poorer/less skilled migrate) 
Are spent on 'unproductive' or 'personal' 
investment (e.g. real state, housing) 
 Create envy and resentment and induce 
consumption spending among non-
migrants 
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4. The Brain Drain and Africa 
 
The problem of Brain Drain is particularly acute for Africa, with the Economic Commission for 
Africa (ECA) arguing that the continent loses a higher proportion of its skilled labour force to 
out-migration than do other developing country regions.  The ECA also argues that the most 
important developmental challenge for Africa is the bridging of the labour-force gap with 
developing countries in other regions (UNECA, 2004).  The recent Commission for Africa 
report concurs, arguing: 
“Africa has been lacking skilled men and women in all these spheres and fundamental to this 
shortage is the loss of much of Africa’s pool of skills to the developed world. Around 70 per 
cent of Ghanaian medical officers trained in the 1990s have left and it has been estimated 
that there are more African scientists and engineers working in the USA than in the whole of 
Africa.” (Commission for Africa, 2005:130). 
The report then goes on to suggest that “the shortage starts with higher education”.  
However: 
“many of Africa’s higher education institutions are still in a state of crisis. They lack physical 
infrastructure, such as internet access, libraries, textbooks, equipment, laboratories and 
classroom space. Senegal’s Université Cheikh Ata Diop built for 13,000 students now houses 
over 23,000. They lack human resources, such as teachers, lecturers, and administrative and 
managerial systems. Unattractive conditions, brain drain and HIV and AIDS are depleting 
capacity and faculties are ageing. … Yet demand for higher education is increasing: in 2000, 
Nigeria had the capacity to accept only 12 per cent of qualified candidates. Hit by these 
pressures and a lack of funding, the research capacity of Africa’s institutes has declined. The 
capacity that does exist is not being used efficiently, as there is limited collaboration, and 
human and financial resources are spread thinly” (Ibid:130). 
These problems are doubly significant since Africa has effectively been caught up in a 
vicious cycle in which a lack of development, political instability and crisis (Dzvimbo, 2003) 
has contributed as a push factor to brain drain, further undermining the conditions for 
development (Dolvo, 2003; Okome, 2002). In addition to this, tight labour markets, skill 
shortages and the demand for technology-led growth in developed countries have generated 
considerable pull factors with some recruitment specifically targeted at African states (El-
Khawas, 2004).  Okome argues that push and pull factors in relation to African migration are 
inseparable and arise from dominant developments in the global economy.  While the causal 
variables may be the same – globalisation, indebtedness, external intervention in African 
economies and at the time of writing in 2002 a cyclical global economic downturn – the 
effects can be felt differently between places and over time (2002). 
Logan (1987) argues that sub-Saharan African countries that exported large amounts of 
experts to the United States during the 1970s and 80s shared similar characteristics.  He 
argues that they tended to have a large population, relatively strong education systems, be 
pro-western in orientation (Logan’s research took place during the Cold War battle for Africa), 
have links with former colonial metropoles, language similarities with the receiving states, a 
tendency toward poor governance and social dislocation (he does not mention the obvious 
budget cuts) resulting from structural adjustment.  These findings are also supported by 
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research for the World Bank that shows that structural adjustment, contraction of university 
capacity, resulting student unrest and government intervention all shaped the migration of 
academics in the 1980s and early 1990s (Blair and Jordan, 1994).  Logan also argues that 
the scale of the African brain drain (or, as he calls it, reverse transfer of technology) gathered 
pace during the 1980s and 1990s, and that the continent is more dependent on ‘immigrant 
experts’ than any other (1992).  Taken together these features, mean that “there is little 
doubt that RTT [Reverse Transfer of Technology] poses serious threats for African 
development in the twenty first Century” (2000: 442). 
Logan (2000) has also conducted survey research with academics in Zimbabwe in an 
attempt to identify the causal factors behind the country’s transition from being a magnet for 
skilled workers from elsewhere in Africa (and from the Zimbabwean diaspora abroad) to 
being in a position of net emigration.  Logan explains the past attraction of Zimbabwe to 
academics from abroad as resulting from the optimism associated with the early 
independence period, democratisation and purposeful nation-building programmes including 
comparatively (with other countries in the region) high academic salaries.  However, he also 
highlights the more recent economic stagnation, social unrest and political repression.  The 
sample group in Logan’s survey were roughly equally split between those who preferred to 
stay and those who expressed a preference to leave.  The latter group tended to be younger, 
less experienced and to be less satisfied with their salaries and terms and conditions.  This 
group also cite poor research and teaching facilities as significant causes of disenchantment.  
Interestingly, however, those expressing a desire to leave did not necessarily wish to go to 
destinations in the developed world.  Though Britain, the US, Germany, France, Italy, 
Canada and Australia all featured in the top twelve, other (Southern) African nations were the 
most popular, particularly Mozambique, South Africa and Botswana.   
Edokat (2000), documents the evolution of the higher education system in Cameroon from 
one university and 213 students in 1960/1 to six universities, more than 45,000 students and 
a staff of around 2,000 in 1998.  He argues that while salary bonuses for academic staff 
between 1976 and 1993 helped to incentivise academia as a profession, budget cuts 
imposed via Structural Adjustment Plans in 1993 ended these.  Since then Cameroon has 
faced difficulty in retaining academics in general and particularly in sciences, engineering 
and most of all in economics, where he cites lecturers with PhDs as extremely rare.  
Addressing the motivations for leaving, Edokat argues that the overall level of funding and its 
implications for wages, conditions and teaching and research infrastructure (laboratories, 
libraries, offices, computers) as being the primary variable, with many academics indicating 
in survey responses that they wish to leave, but would stay if there were improvements in 
these areas.  In addition, he argues that freedom from political repression and academic 
freedom are also crucial variables. 
Ibra Diene, General Secretary of the Senegalese Union of Higher Education Teachers 
argues that the brain drain, spurred by poor conditions of service in developing countries, is 
effecting a resource transfer from developing to developed countries: 
“By failing to provide decent conditions for their lecturers, poor countries are effectively 
funding universities in rich countries, since they are releasing staff virtually free of charge who 
are trained and often have considerable expertise and experience” (ICFTU, 2004b). 
Diene’ also highlights the importance of pull-push factors related to working conditions and 
resources such as “research facilities, scientific and intellectual stimulus, greater academic 
freedom and better career development”. 
Oni (2000) highlights the historical importance of universities in building domestic institutional 
and economic capacity in Nigeria.  Again he highlights the massive expansion of the HE 
system in Nigeria since its establishment in 1948 at Ibadan University with 104 students.  By 
1999 this had risen to 39 universities, 235,000 students and more than 12,300 academic 
staff.  Despite this, he also documents unmet demand with growing numbers of failed 
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applications, to the extent that only 16% of applications were accepted by 1991, implying 
serious under-supply.  Even with the low proportion of admissions to applications 
lecturer/student ratios are more than double those in the UK on UNESCO data.  Again noting 
the impact of restrictive budgets, especially in the context of austerity-based adjustment 
measures, he compares salary levels for academic staff in Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia and 
South Africa, concluding that a professor in Nigeria earns 1% of a professor’s salary in South 
Africa.  As important is the difference between academic salaries and those of other 
professions in Nigeria, particularly in government, the civil service and oil.  He documents the 
frequent attempts of Nigerian academics and academic trade unions to confront the 
government over the impact of low levels of funding on staff salaries, morale and the quality 
of teaching and research infrastructure.  It is the combination of these factors and the 
typically authoritarian responses of Nigerian governments (sequestering Union funds, 
proscribing further action and harassment, arrest and detention of union leaders) which leads 
to brain-drain tendencies: 
“As a result of their inability to maintain a decent standard of living with their salaries, some 
have resorted to voting with their feet to look for better opportunities in the private sector or as 
consultants to international organisations or government; while others have either migrated to 
other countries or engaged in trading.  Under the military regime some have entered into the 
bureaucracy as ministers, special advisers to governors and heads of government 
parastatals.  For the period 1988 and 1990 when the fall in government revenue was very low 
and inflation was high (41%) the National Universities Commission confirmed the separation 
of over 1000 lecturers from the universities” (Oni, 2000). 
Okome (2002) also notes the importance of political repression as a driving factor in 
emigration from the country during the 1980s and 90s. 
While the tendency is to think of the brain drain as defined by movement of skilled 
professionals to developed countries, Oni notes the loss of academics to South Africa and 
the middle east as well as ‘internal brain drain’ or the movement of academics and potential 
academics from higher education to other sectors, with the consequence that their potential 
wider role in capacity building and development is impaired.  Okome highlights the complex 
interplay of policies on the scale and type of migration between developing countries and 
between developing and developed countries.  For instance he suggests that currency 
policies (which are often impacted on by decisions in developed countries because of 
‘pegging’ to the dollar, Franc or now Euro) can generate different types of movement: 
“By the end of the 1980s, with France deporting illegal immigrants and denying automatic 
citizenship to the offspring of immigrants that were born in within its borders, and the French 
decision to cease shoring up the currencies of its West African allies, the effects of the 
economic malaise that beset the African continent were now intensified in the CFA zone as 
well. In January 1994, France devalued the CFA franc, a currency that is used in 14 West and 
Central African countries. Nigeria immediately became overwhelmingly attractive to 
immigrants from West and Central African currencies for whom its currency was now worth 50 
percent more because it was pegged to the U.S. dollar.  Curiously, in the same years, 
Nigerians were hell-bent on leaving their country if they could because the devaluation of the 
Naira (the Nigerian currency) had also down-graded their standard of living and quality of life.” 
Kómoláfé (2003) argues that: 
“Nigerian migrants move predominantly to the countries where they are more likely to adjust 
rapidly in terms of being able to understand the host country’s language, to secure gainful 
employment and to reunite with members of their family, friends or associate with other 
people from their country of origin”. 
As such he argues that the UK is a major destination for Nigerian migrants, as does Okome 
(2002).  Kómoláfé also finds that migration from Nigeria has been boosted by frequent 
rounds of economic and social dislocation and resort to military government. 
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Wadda (2000) notes that academic brain drain has not been a prominent feature in the 
Gambia because of the absence, until recently, of a university in the country.  Instead the 
loss of skilled professionals has tended to focus on the civil service and government, with 
poor management, low pay and insecure employment being contributory factors.  However, a 
related problem has been the permanent loss of students sent abroad to study. Even with the 
application of punitive bonds to encourage return, “significant proportions” seek to remain in 
their host country once their studies are completed.   
Skilled migration from developing countries does not only present a developmental capacity 
problem in relation to higher education.  For instance Dolvo (2003) demonstrates the major 
problems facing the health sector in Ghana, with a large number of Doctors, other 
professionals and nurses leaving the country for Europe, especially the UK, where demand 
for medical personnel is due to rise still further over coming decades (Wanless, 2002).   
The issue of teacher migration from South Africa is well documented with teacher shortages 
in the UK having been offset by migrants from South Africa (BBC, 2001).  The problem is not 
only manifest in teaching but in nursing and other skilled professions.  Bhorat et al. (2002: 
19) note that there are over 200 South African Dentists in the UK and the migration of Nurses 
is a noted national problem.  The South African Medical and Dental Council estimated in 
1995 that: 
“…about 150 doctors emigrate each year (approximately 0.7% of the stock)21. Given that the 
number of doctors graduating a year is growing at marginally more than 1% per annum with 
population growing at 2.3%, this is causing great concern in medical circles and in the 
restructuring of the health services.” (Kaplan and Charum, 1998). 
Because of this, the ‘Brain Drain’ has become a national policy debate in South Africa 
(DACST, 2002; Brown, 1998; Kaplan and Meyer, 1998).  The activities of foreign 
governments in recruiting groups of key workers has aroused controversy and some anger.  
Crush (2002) demonstrates the issue: 
“In 1998, the provincial government of Alberta, Canada, developed a proactive strategy to 
deal with the growing shortage of family doctors in rural communities in the province.  The 
government’s health ministry retained a private immigration agency to recruit South African 
doctors.  The agency launched a recruiting drive in South Africa with lavish dinners and slick 
presentations for interested physicians.  A chartered jet flew 44 physicians and their families 
to Canada for a weekend at Lake Louise, one of Canada’s premier tourist resorts.  The 
physicians then dispersed to spend time in the communities, where the were feted and 
offered considerable financial inducements to come.  All subsequently decamped to Alberta, 
along with another 40 who emigrated under the same programme without taking advantage of 
the recruiter’s largesse.  The estimated cost of training a South African doctor is $150,000.  
The Alberta government spent a mere $1.2 million on the recruiting scheme, providing a 
$10.4 million net gain of medical expertise at South African expense. Organised government-
sponsored skills raiding of this kind represents one end of a spectrum of public and private-
sector recruiting activity that targets the skill base of developing countries like South Africa” 
(Crush, 2002: 147-8). 
He also notes the furore that has accompanied these actions, citing the Minister of Health in 
South Africa as saying in parliament that the South African government would: 
“continue to object vigorously whenever developed countries plunder the meagre skills 
resources of developing countries in organised raids.  Countries that systematically under-
produce  skilled workers because  it  is cheaper to poach them from poorer countries are 
guilty of exploitation” (quoted in Crush, 2002: 148). 
The South African Department of Home Affairs has also published several reports (RSA 
Department of Home Affairs, 1997; RSA Task Team on International Migration, 1999) linking 
skills shortages to the lack of internal capacity for development (Department for Arts, Culture, 
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Science and Technology, 2002), brain drain and, despite the protests at the international 
recruitment actions of others, the need to attract skilled labour from abroad: 
“We believe that there is a serious shortage of skills at the higher end of the labour market in 
many occupational categories and that this situation will worsen if South Africa enters upon a 
projected period of sustained economic growth and infrastructure delivery. These shortages 
are exacerbated by an under-enumerated brain-drain from South Africa to other industrial 
states. Internal training capacity is too limited to make up the shortfall in the short to medium 
term….In our view, aggressive local skills training (brain-train) and brain-gain strategies must 
be pursued in tandem in the short to medium term. Brain-gain strategies involve individual 
and group recruiting in key sectors; and promoting links with skilled nationals and former 
nationals abroad to encourage permanent or temporary return.” (RSA Department of Home 
Affairs, 1997). 
Bhorat et al. (2002) review the issue in some depth.  Among push factors they highlight the 
deteriorating crime and public safety context, the cost of living, increased taxation, a 
perception among whites that public services (particularly education and health) have 
declined in quality and perceptions of the chances for improvement in the future.  Mattes and 
Richmond (2002), based on survey research, provide extensive support for these arguments. 
In fact Bhorat et al pose the end of apartheid as a potential explanatory variable for 
increasing intensions to migrate among skilled whites.  However, this is rejected because of 
the high levels of migration that preceded the formal end of apartheid: 
“The actual brain drain  - that is the net loss of skilled human resources – is not directly and 
essentially tied to the social and political change of the mid-90s; it started significantly earlier 
than the onset of these changes.  This change may have amplified the phenomenon but it is 
not the origin of it.  The emigration of skilled professionals increased by only 21%...” (Bhorat 
et al., 2002). 
Bhorat et al. might be correct that the formal end of the apartheid system did not correlate so 
directly with emigration.  However, during the years preceding the transition, it became 
obvious that change was inevitable and the preceding levels of emigration may have been 
related to this.  Kaplan (1997) also provides evidence that migration from South Africa has in 
the past been related to civil and political unrest, including the period up to the formation of 
the Government of National Unity in 1993 and Crush (2002: 150-1) notes that “some of these 
emigrants are self-styled refugees from democracy (privileged whites who rather than face 
the redistribution of privilege have decided to leave for other shores)”.  Nevertheless since 
skilled migration is a concern for many countries where these factors do not pertain, Bhorat 
el al.’s argument that the race issue is a significant contextual rather than ultimate 
explanatory variable must be taken seriously.  Indeed government policy has both 
recognised previous racial biases in immigration/emigration policy and attempted to shift the 
debate to one based on human capital inputs and the skills needs of the economy, in moves 
presented by some critics as willing submission to corporate interests (Crush, 2002): 
“instead of letting whites in and keeping blacks out as candidates for naturalisation, as was 
apartheid’s want, we should admit individuals who have desirable skills, expertise, resources 
and entrepreneurial will, if they add value and if our own people cannot now or in the future fill 
the need in whichever areas or niches of life economic development will undoubtedly create. 
We argue, therefore, in favour of more open and effectively managed rules of entry driven by 
Iabour-market  need.” (RSA Department of Home Affairs, 1997: 19). 
South Africa is well placed as a sender nation also because of its well developed education 
system meaning that its most skilled workers can integrate into global labour markets, with 
the added advantage of English as the dominant global language.  Thus skilled emigration 
from South Africa is facilitated not only by ‘push’ factors, but by the way in which these link to 
global ‘pull’ factors.  Bhorat et al. (2002) identify these pull factors as general economic and 
technical change on a global scale which generate demand and wage premiums for skilled 
workers, alongside demographic change and ageing populations in developed countries and 
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perceptions of a more stable, political and social environment.  In addition to these, they note 
specific pull factors related to South Africans such as significant expatriate communities and 
networks in many advanced economies such as the UK, which makes information flow about 
opportunities abroad and the potential for settlement easier.  Bhorat et al. note economic and 
technological change as creating increased demand for skilled labour in South Africa at the 
very point at which it is being sucked out of the country, effectively augmenting the problem. 
Bhorat et al. examine the brain drain issue using data from the top five receiving countries 
(UK, USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand) which they suggest account for 75% of all 
South African emigrants.  Comparing this data with South African entry data they argue that 
net emigration during the 1987-97 period was 233,609.  Of this about 18% were skilled 
professionals (1989-97).  They also identify the receiving countries, of which the UK was by 
far the largest recipient, accounting for around half of all South African emigration, with the 
US receiving between 11% and 15%.  This data is largely in line with earlier estimates 
(Kaplan and Meyer, 1998; Kaplan, Meyer and Brown, 1999), though Crush (2002) suggests 
that they are under-estimates because of the impact of short-term migration on facilitated 
fixed-contracts and emigration to states beyond the five most important ones.  It is not only 
immigration that had a highly racialised character: 
“The intellectual diaspora is overwhelmingly white. In 1985, 142,007 out of a total university 
student body of 215,786 were white ie. approximately two-thirds. But, it was not only the 
predominance of white graduates that account for the racial characteristic of the diaspora. It 
was also white graduates who had easier access to the industrialised countries. This was 
because many of them possessed or could immediately claim entry rights, particularly to the 
United Kingdom, because many had family and other social networks abroad, and because 
most of them had English as a mother tongue.” (Kaplan, 1997). 
This diaspora has formed over many years meaning that the political reasons for more 
contemporary skilled migration from South Africa do not shape the political characterics of 
the whole.  As such, unlike more recent emigrants, the stocks of skilled migrants abroad 
might be more inclined to support contemporary South African nation building and 
development: 
“One further characteristic, but one more difficult to specify precisely or to quantitatively 
substantiate, is that the political disposition of many of those in South Africa's intellectual 
diaspora are likely to be of a "liberal" persuasion. The term "liberal" here is used very loosely 
to denote an opposition to the previous apartheid regime and a likely broad support or, at 
least, sympathy for the "new" South Africa.” (Kaplan, 1997: 9). 
Regardless of these specifics, Bhorat et al. (2002), comparing both inflows and outflows for 
two periods, immediately prior to the end of apartheid and immediately after it, find that the 
biggest factor in contributing to the net change is the decline in inflows:  
“the worsening of the situation [skill shortages], however is due less to an increase on the 
emigration side than to a decrease on immigration one.  Statistically, the deficit of skills is 
strongly related to a decrease in immigration.” (Bhorat et al., 2002: 14). 
This finding contradicts the often held notion of South Africa as a magnet for skilled migration 
from other Southern African states.  Indeed several authors (Bhorat et al., 2002; Kaplan, 
1997; Kaplan and Charum, 1998) specifically investigated this issue and found that since 
1994 this has not been the case and that South Africa 
“experiences a net loss towards the SADC partners…far from being a country draining on the 
skilled resources of its neighbours, South Africa was recently sending more people to these 
countries (particularly Zimbabwe and Nambia) than it receives”.6  (Bhorat et al., 2002: 18). 
                                                
6 SADC is the Southern African Development Community. 
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Bhorat et al.’s analysis also draws important considerations for the overall brain drain 
argument in South Africa in their discussion of skills shortages and labour market trends.  
Like in many developed countries, they identify skills shortages at the top end of the skills 
distribution as coexisting with high rates of unemployment at the other pole.  The problem for 
South Africa, though, is grossly amplified with 36% of the economically active population 
being jobless in 1999.  This is a significant factor and should shape conclusions as to the 
nature of the Brain Drain problem because it suggests that the under-utilisation of human 
capital resources within the country is a significant issue.  This is further supported by their 
discussion of higher education which they suggest significantly under-performs in meeting 
labour market needs. Specifically, they argue that there is both under-supply and 
mismatched supply as the system neither produces enough or the right type of skills.  They 
note declining degree awards and an increasing focus in home economics, philosophy, 
languages and public administration: 
“These statistics indicate that tertiary institutions have been producing a growing number of 
graduates in fields where demand for these skills has not been growing.  Furthermore there 
has been little real growth, if any, of awards in the fields where labour demand has grown 
rapidly during this period.  There is therefore a mismatch between supply of skilled personnel 
by tertiary institutions and their demand in the labour market, which adds to the growing 
shortage of skills.” (Bhorat et al., 2002: 21). 
These deficiencies in the South African HE system are recognised by the government and 
were cited as part of the justification for reform in the 1996 Green Paper on HE reform (RSA 
Department of Education, 1996).  The document also notes that “the attrition and ageing of 
well-qualified academic staff and the emigration of graduate labour compels attention” 
underlining the point that academic migration is not merely part of the broader brain drain but 
acts as a barrier to domestic skills formation that might offset it. 
As a result of the recognition of the skills shortage, there has been increasing debate in 
South Africa about measures to both take advantage of the opportunities presented by the 
South African Diaspora for technology and knowledge transfer and for attracting and 
retaining skilled professionals.  Thus South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) has 
been created to facilitate the transfer of knowledge and skills back to South Africa.  SANSA 
was to facilitate these transfers through temporary South African student placements with 
expatriate academics, collaborative training and research projects, facilitation of business 
networks and the initiation of spin-out ventures (Brown, 1998). 
South Africa also acts as an example of some of the potentially problematic examples of the 
structural impacts of high skilled mobility.  Bhorat et al. note trends in the debate suggesting 
that domestic policy changes in favour of the black population will lead to flight among skilled 
whites.  This is a long-run debate in South African politics and intrinsically related to 
ideologies of power that supported the previous regime (Hirschman, 1970). 
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5. The Brain Drain and UK Higher  
          Education 
5.1 Introduction 
Skilled migration clearly brings important economic, social and cultural benefits to the UK.  
With an ageing workforce these benefits are now and potentially will be even more beneficial 
to the UK higher education sector in future years.  The scale and impact of skilled migrants 
from developing countries working in UK higher education is small, especially when 
compared with the overall proportion of foreign nationals working in the sector from other 
developed countries.  However, because of the relatively scarcity of skilled labour in many 
developing countries, the impact of the loss of these skills to developing countries is 
potentially much more significant. 
5.2 General Scale of Migration to UK 
Data from the Home Office (2003a) shows that in 2002 12.2 million people were allowed to 
enter the UK.  Of these, the vast majority were either UK nationals returning to the country, 
European Economic Area nationals or people on short-term visits to the UK. 119,000 people 
entered the UK on work permits (including dependents). Trends in Work Permit Holder 
immigration (Table 6) show a rising number of both short and long-term Work Permit 
Holders.  Consideration of the region of origin of Work Permit holders (Table 7) and their 
highlights similar trends to those for students.  Work Permit holder from the Americas have 
declined as a proportion of the total, while both the number and proportion of Work Permit 
immigrants from Africa, the Indian Sub-continent and the ‘rest of Asia’ have risen markedly 
over the period 1999-2003. 
Data on the occupational status of immigrants and emigrants to/from the UK is available from 
the Office for National Statistics (2004), though the data is only broken down to broad 
occupational group (see Table 8).  This shows that around half of all immigrants to the UK 
are employed and that this group has been growing in significance as a proportion of the 
whole over recent years.  Among the remaining immigrants around a quarter are students 
and 15-20% are housewives or children, leaving around 5% classified as ‘other adults’ in 
occupational terms.  Changes in recent years have seen students growing as a proportion of 
the total with a small rise also for Professional and Managerial occupations and a small 
decline in the proportions described as housewives or children.  In terms of outflows, 
Professional and Managerial occupations have risen in significance over the period 1993-
2002 as have manual and clerical workers.  However, the balance (see Table 9) has tended 
to remain positive across all categories and to grow over time, meaning that more people are 
entering the UK than leaving. 
Dustman et al. (2003) examine the educational attainment of migrants in the UK using 
evidence from the Labour Force Survey.  They compare data on arrival, age and gender.  
They also disaggregate this data for the proportion of male and female immigrants with 
degree level qualifications and compare this with the UK-born population.  They find that 
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overall immigrants are more polarised in terms of educational attainment.  The proportion of 
the immigrant population both who have a degree and have no qualifications – i.e. at either 
pole of the qualifications distribution – is higher than the UK-born population.  
The proportion of UK-born with degree level qualifications is 16% while it is 21% for all 
immigrants.  However, there are significant differences in this finding if the ethnic origin of 
immigrants is considered.  For instance, the proportion of immigrants with degree level 
qualifications is substantially higher for Africans (33%), Chinese (31%) and people from other 
English speaking developed countries (26%) such as the US, Australia or New Zealand and 
those categorised only as “other white” (32%).  Significantly though, comparing between data 
for 1983 and 2000 the relative qualifications profile of African, Indian and Chinese immigrants 
has risen dramatically offering some support to the Brain Drain thesis that structural 
economic change leads to changing patterns of labour demand and immigration.  However, 
LFS data is effectively a stock measure meaning that it shares some similar problems to the 
Carrington and Detragiache data referred to above, telling us little about where education 
took place.  The only indication on this issue is derived from median ages of entry.  While this 
data is also inconclusive showing median ages of entry which suggest that education may 
have been split between home country and the UK, it does suggest that African and Chinese 
immigrants and those from developed English speaking countries may be more likely to have 
received a greater proportion of their education in their home countries. 
Research for the Department for Work and Pensions (Haque, 2002) shows that migrants 
have more difficulty competing for jobs than the UK-born.  The employment rate for 
immigrants generally was around 64% while it is about 75% for the UK-born.  However, this 
is again a differentiated experience with the gap between immigrant workers and UK-born 
workers being less pronounced at higher skill levels than at lower skill levels.  Findings in 
relation to pay were perhaps surprising, showing that immigrant workers tend to earn more 
than their UK-born counterparts with the gap being more pronounced at high skill levels and 
among those who reported “other qualifications” possibly indicating that they were filling 
specific skill gaps.   
5.3 Pull Factors in UK HE 
Structural Change in the Economy 
The UK demonstrates many of the general pull factors highlighted in the literature.  For 
instance, general economic and structural change is clearly demonstrated in the UK 
economy with a gradual shift from large-scale manufacturing to service based employment 
patterns.  For instance more than 70% of employment in the UK is now in the service sector 
and manufacturing and primary continue to decline, despite retaining significant social 
importance in parts of the Northern regions (ONS, 2004a).  This sectoral change in 
employment is changing the skills demands of employers.  Alongside this sectoral change, 
the skills intensity of work is also increasing (LSC, 2004), both naturally and as the result of 
leverage from the Government who are keen to raise the skills demands of employers still 
further as they pursue a twin strategy of high labour productivity and employment-intensive 
growth (see HM Treasury, 2000; 2001; 2004).  In many instances the supply of skills cannot 
meet demand (LSC, 2004).  This pattern of structural change, sectoral reorientation and 
pressures for up-skilling are replicated across advanced economies in Europe (see CEC, 
2003).  Taken together these  features of the economies of the UK and EU and the failure to 
fully meet enhanced skills need with existing labour supply, in addition to the labour market in 
the UK being almost at full capacity (ONS, 2004b; DWP, 2003), form a powerful combination 
of pull factors for international migration of skilled workers, including in higher education. 
 
 
Table 5: Student Entry to the UK by Country of Origin (1999-2003) 
 1999 2000 2001  2002 2003
 No. % of total No. % of total No. % of total No. % of total No. % of total
All Nationalities 272,330 100.0% 312,500 100% 339,195 100.0% 368,795 100.0% 318,630 100.0% 
Europe 62,340 22.9% 69,820 22% 75,320 22.2% 75,965 20.6% 64,085 20.1% 
Americas 87,530 32.1% 99,115 32% 98,985 29.2% 101,050 27.4% 89,270 28.0% 
Africa 17,920 6.6% 20,325 7% 25,165 7.4% 27,625 7.5% 24,500 7.7% 
Indian Sub-
Continent 
8,505 3.1% 10,375 3% 14,650 4.3% 19,585 5.3% 24,725 7.8% 
Rest of Asia 92,515 34.0% 109,955 35% 121,725 35.9% 141,060 38.2% 112,380 35.3% 
Oceania 1,995 0.7% 2,015 1% 2,390 0.7% 2,325 0.6% 2,780 0.9% 
Other Nationalities 1,530 0.6% 900 0% 960 0.3% 1,190 0.3% 890 0.3% 
Home Office (2003a). 2003 data is provisional. 
Table 6: Immigration of Work Permit Holders and Dependants  (1999-2003) 
All Nationalities 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Employment for 12 Months or more 25,090 36,290 50,280 51,525 44,480 
Employment for less than 12 Months 28,445 30,785 30,785 34,095 36,870 
Dependants of Work Permit holders 22,645 24,970 27,760 34,495 37,830 
Total 76,180 92,045 108,825 120,115 119,180 
Home Office (2003a). 2003 data is provisional. 
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Table 7: Work Permits Holders and Dependants by Region of Origin (1999-2003) 
All Nationalities 1999 2000 2001  2002 2003 
 No. % of total No. % of total No. % of total No. % of total No. % of total 
All Nationalities 76,180 100.0% 92,045 100.0% 108,825 100.0% 120,115 100.0% 119,180 100.0% 
Europe 9,330 12.2% 9,880 10.7% 10,040 9.2% 14,090 11.7% 17,785 14.9% 
Americas 30,740 40.4% 33,855 36.8% 31,375 28.8% 31,900 26.6% 29,250 24.5% 
Africa 7,425 9.7% 9,160 10.0% 14,100 13.0% 15,695 13.1% 14,400 12.1% 
Indian Sub-
Continent 
8,715 11.4% 13,915 15.1% 19,750 18.1% 22,810 19.0% 25,580 21.5% 
Rest of Asia 14,025 18.4% 17,960 19.5% 23,645 21.7% 26,030 21.7% 24,935 20.9% 
Oceania 5,815 7.6% 7,175 7.8% 9,785 9.0% 9,370 7.8% 7,070 5.9% 
Other 
Nationalities 
135 0.2% 105 0.1% 125 0.1% 220 0.2% 160 0.1% 
Home Office (2003a). 2003 data is provisional. 
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Table 8: Migration flows into the UK by Occupation (1993-2002) 
 All 
persons 
Professional and 
Managerial 
Manual and Clerical Students Housewives Other 
Adults 
Children Employed 
People as 
 No No % of total No % of 
total 
No % of 
total 
No % of 
total 
No % of 
total 
No % of 
total 
% of total 
Inflow    
1993 265.1 78.1 29.5% 51.4 19.4% 57.6 21.7% 28.2 10.6% 12.9 4.9% 37 14.0% 49 
1994 314.4 95.4 30.3% 66.4 21.1% 59.2 18.8% 31.9 10.1% 21 6.7% 40.6 12.9% 51 
1995 311.9 100 32.1% 56.9 18.2% 74.1 23.8% 27.1 8.7% 16.8 5.4% 37.1 11.9% 50 
1996 317.8 100.9 31.7% 63.6 20.0% 72.9 22.9% 28 8.8% 17.1 5.4% 35.4 11.1% 52 
1997 326.1 100.9 30.9% 50.3 15.4% 87.6 26.9% 25.2 7.7% 16.8 5.2% 45.3 13.9% 46 
1998 390.3 127.7 32.7% 81.4 20.9% 85.5 21.9% 28.8 7.4% 25.8 6.6% 41.1 10.5% 54 
1999 453.8 149.9 33.0% 92 20.3% 105.7 23.3% 34.8 7.7% 25.7 5.7% 45.6 10.0% 53 
2000 483.4 184.2 38.1% 82.8 17.1% 102.8 21.3% 41 8.5% 31.9 6.6% 40.7 8.4% 55 
2001 479.6 160.9 33.5% 91.3 19.0% 117.2 24.4% 36.3 7.6% 24.4 5.1% 49.5 10.3% 53 
2002 512.8 165.4 32.3% 100.3 19.6% 140.1 27.3% 40.1 7.8% 25.6 5.0% 41.4 8.1% 52 
Outflow    
1993 266.3 86.3 32.4% 53 19.9% 52.3 19.6% 24.6 9.2% 11 4.1% 39.1 14.7% 52 
1994 237.6 69.5 29.3% 57.2 24.1% 45.9 19.3% 19.9 8.4% 13.5 5.7% 31.7 13.3% 53 
1995 236.5 77.5 32.8% 49.7 21.0% 50 21.1% 15.6 6.6% 10.4 4.4% 33.4 14.1% 54 
1996 263.7 100.6 38.1% 54.8 20.8% 41.4 15.7% 17.1 6.5% 4.9 1.9% 44.9 17.0% 59 
1997 279.2 104 37.2% 57.7 20.7% 54.9 19.7% 21.6 7.7% 11 3.9% 29.9 10.7% 58 
1998 251.5 96.9 38.5% 50.4 20.0% 45.2 18.0% 22.2 8.8% 10.2 4.1% 26.5 10.5% 59 
1999 290.8 112.1 38.5% 77.9 26.8% 45.5 15.6% 16.9 5.8% 9.4 3.2% 29.1 10.0% 65 
2000 320.7 143.2 44.7% 66 20.6% 59.7 18.6% 15.5 4.8% 8.5 2.7% 27.8 8.7% 65 
2001 307.7 122.5 39.8% 69.3 22.5% 52.9 17.2% 18.5 6.0% 17.4 5.7% 27.1 8.8% 62 
2002 359.4 139.2 38.7% 89 24.8% 57.9 16.1% 24.2 6.7% 21.5 6.0% 27.6 7.7% 64 
ONS (2004). 
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Table 9: Balance of Immigration/Emigration UK, by occupation (1993-2002) 
 All 
persons 
Professional 
and 
Managerial 
Manual and 
Clerical 
Students Housewive
s 
Other Adults Childre
n 
1993 -1.2 -8.2 -1.6 5.3 3.6 1.8 -2.1 
1994 76.8 25.9 9.3 13.3 12 7.5 8.8 
1995 75.4 22.5 7.2 24.1 11.5 6.5 3.7 
1996 54.1 0.3 8.8 31.5 10.8 12.1 -9.5 
1997 46.8 3.2 -7.5 32.7 3.6 5.7 15.4 
1998 138.8 30.7 31 40.4 6.6 15.6 14.6 
1999 163 37.9 14.1 60.3 18 16.3 16.5 
2000 162.8 41.1 16.8 43.1 25.5 23.4 12.9 
2001 171.8 38.4 22 64.3 17.7 7 22.4 
2002 153.4 26.1 11.3 82.2 15.9 4.1 13.8 
ONS (2004). 
 
This general pattern of structural change is  augmented substantially in the UK by the 
specific demographic profile of staff in higher education and the demands placed on the 
system to expand to meet the government’s widening participation agenda.  For instance, 
nearly a third of research and teaching staff in higher education are over 50.  The overall 
proportion of over-50s employed in UK higher education has risen from 23% to 28% between 
1995/6 and 2002/3.  The ageing workforce is also concentrated in specific subject areas.  For 
instance, education, mathematics, engineering disciplines, architecture and the built 
environment disciplines and some modern languages all had over 40% of their staff aged 
over 50 in 2002/3 (AUT, 2004). At the same time staff numbers in UK higher education have 
been expanding, by more than 10,000 staff (9%) between 1997/8 and 2002/3 (HESA, 2005) 
with the latest data indicating a further rise of more than 1,300 staff between 2002/3 and 
2003/4 (HESA, 2005a).7 
UK Migration Policies 
In recent years the UK has operated several programmes intended to attract skilled workers 
including the Work Permit System and the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme.  The Work 
Permit system operates through employers who make requests to Work Permits UK, a Home 
Office quango for a permit to last up to five years.  Work Permits UK makes decisions based 
on consultation with industry experts, trade unions and employers over the skills needs of the 
economy and is advised in doing so by sector-specific panels.  Employers need to 
demonstrate that they are UK based, that there is a genuine vacancy and that the individual 
is skilled at least to NVQ level 3 or above (roughly equivalent to A-level).  The High Skilled 
Migration Programme was initially a pilot programme but allowed people deemed to be of 
high skills to enter the UK for a year, with a further potential to apply for leave to remain.  
Decisions were made on a points system (McLaughlin and Salt, 2002). 
More recently the focus on differentiating between skilled and less skilled immigrants has 
been substantially strengthened.  In February 2005 the government released Controlling our 
Borders: Making Migration work for Britain, complete with ministerial and Prime Ministerial 
forewords, marking the high profile strategy as part of the Government’s series of five year 
plans in advance of the general election (Home Office, 2005a).  The document clearly 
establishes the main purpose of allowing immigration to the UK as realising economic gains 
from the skills of migrants: 
“There are gaps in our labour market that cannot be filled by the domestic workforce. Skilled 
migrants, students and visitors bring major economic benefits, with net inward migration 
contributing 10-15% of forecast UK trend economic growth.” (11). 
The new system is to have four tiers: 
• Tier one: The Highly Skilled – This group includes “doctors, engineers, finance experts and 
IT specialists”, who will be allowed to enter the UK without a pre-existing job offer, to look for 
work.  This category also includes investors and entrepreneurs who will be allowed to enter 
on the  basis of the size of their investment or the number of jobs they might create. 
• Tier two: The Skilled – This group includes those with NVQ Level 3 and above who will be 
allowed to enter if they have a job offer in a shortage area, where no domestic alternative is 
available.  Despite the description of skills needs for this group being level 3+ the example 
occupational groups are Nurses, teachers and administrators, who would normally require at 
least a Level 4 qualification and in the case of teachers a post-graduate qualification also. 
• Tier three: Low Skilled – This group will be designated on a quota basis with reference to 
specific skills shortage areas.  With the enlargement of the EU, quotas in agricultural sectors 
                                                
7 Changes in the methodology mean that it is only possible to compare between 1997/8 and 2002/3 
and then between adjusted figures for 2002/3 and 2003/4.  See HESA (2005a) for details. 
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will be removed because these will be able to be filled from migration from Eastern Europe.  
Migrants in this category will have only time-limited leave to remain, with guarantees that they 
will leave at the end of this period. 
• Tier four: Students and Specialists – This group will also include temporary working 
arrangements for individuals representing overseas governments or multinationals where 
there is “no significant issue of competition with the domestic labour force”.  This also 
includes sports-people.   
Within the system the Skills for Business Network (the new name for the Sector Skills 
Development Agency) will advise on skills shortages in the economy.  While there is also 
discussion of the Asylum system there is a clear differentiation within the plans for the 
welcome to be extended to some on the basis of their potential economic contribution and 
the tight controls for others based on their need to enter the country. 
5.4 Feedback Effects from the UK – the scale of remittances 
Recent work undertaken by the UK government’s Department for International Development 
(DfID) (2004b) has estimated the annual flow of remittances from the UK.  This work 
concluded that in 2001 the flow of remittances was in the region of £2.3bn or between 70-
80% of UK Overseas Development Assistance.  The primary receiving countries were 
identified as India, Pakistan, Carribean countries, China, Bangladesh, Nigeria and Ghana.  
However, this work also identified a number of issues which limit the benefits of remittances 
for recipients in developing countries.  These were primarily related to transaction and 
included costs, time and security of transactions.  Subsequently DfID has launched the 
website www.sendmoneyhome.org which aims to provide information about different money 
transfer providers to aid migrants in choosing the most suitable channel for sending 
remittances. 
5.5 Foreign Nationals Employed in UK HE 
Table 10 shows the profile of non-UK nationals working as Academic staff in UK HEIs in 
2002.  It shows that around 34,000, 23% of UK academic staff were of non-UK/British 
nationality.  This is slightly up on the total for 1995/6 which, at 27,000 was then just over 21% 
of academic staff in the UK.  Of these around 6000 or 4% of the academic staff headcount 
had no nationality recorded in the Individualised staff record.  Of those whose nationality was 
known, the largest group were nationals of other European Union states, the most numerous 
being German, Irish, French, Italian, Greek and Spanish.  The next largest group were from 
Asia, with the most important non-UK nationalities being Chinese (2,408) and Indian (1,180).  
North America was also an important source of foreign nationals working in UK academia 
with more than 2,000 staff having US nationality. 
Notwithstanding the large proportion of unknown nationalities, foreign nationals from outside 
N. America, Asia and the EU did not make up a large proportion of the UK academic 
headcount.  However, this is not to say that the numbers here are insignificant as a 
proportion of the sending country’s academic workforce.  While data on academic staff in 
many LDCs is scarce, Table 11 shows the numbers of academic staff working in UK HEIs 
with African nationalities by country of nationality.  It shows that 268 staff had South African 
nationalities, 153 were Nigerian, 129 were Egyptian and 120 Algerian.  It also shows that 
there were staff with nationalities of some of the poorest and least developed states in the 
world such as the Sudan (44), Ethiopa (29) and Sierra Leone (25).  Sierra Leone ranks 
bottom of the UNDP’s Human Development Index, Ethiopa ranks seven from bottom and 
Sudan ranks 139th.  There are also many other countries listed in the UNDP’s low human 
development category with nationals working in UK academia, notably Zambia ranked 164 in 
the work on human development and with 33 nationals working as academics in the UK and 
Zimbabwe (ranked 147 and with 77 nationals in UK academia). 
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Table 10: Academic Staff in UK HEIs by Nationality (Continent), Headcount (2002) 
Continent Totals No of Staff in UK HEIs 
(headcount) 
% of Total 
Africa 1339 0.9% 
Asia 5363 3.7% 
Caribbean 147 0.1% 
Central and Latin America 514 0.3% 
EU 12834 8.7% 
EU Country OCTs 17 0.0% 
Europe (Non-EU) 2078 1.4% 
Middle East 662 0.5% 
N. America (US and Canada) 3053 2.1% 
Australasia and Oceana 1791 1.2% 
UK Extra Territorial 58 0.0% 
Stateless 9 0.0% 
Unknown 6107 4.2% 
Total 33972 23.1% 
All Staff Including UK Total 146877 
Higher Education Statistics Agency. 
Table 11: Academic Staff in UK HEIs with African Nationalities, by Country, Headcount (2002) 
Country/Nationality No of Staff 
Algeria   120 
Angola   3 
Benin   1 
Botswana   4 
Cameroon   28 
Central African Republic   1 
Chad   1 
Congo (Democratic Republic)   3 
Congo (People's Republic)   1 
Djibouti   3 
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Egypt   129 
Eritrea   4 
Ethiopia   29 
Gabon   1 
Gambia   8 
Ghana   83 
Guinea   1 
Guinea-Bissau   2 
Ivory Coast   7 
Kenya   53 
Lesotho   1 
Libya   33 
Malawi   16 
Mauritania   9 
Mauritius   88 
Morocco   31 
Mozambique   4 
Namibia   2 
Nigeria   153 
Rwanda   1 
Senegal   6 
Sierra Leone   25 
Somalia   5 
South Africa   268 
Sudan   44 
Swaziland   2 
Tanzania   13 
Togo   2 
Tunisia   22 
Uganda   21 
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Zambia   33 
Zimbabwe   77 
Burkina   1 
Higher Education Statistics Agency. 
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5.6 Overseas Students in the UK and Changes in UK HE 
Over recent years the number of overseas students studying in the UK has risen markedly.  
During 2003 319,000 students entered the UK, a fall on the previous year of about 50,000.  
However, the number of student entries to the UK is still substantially above the level in 1999 
(272,000).  Trends in the country of origin of students entering the UK (see Table 5) show 
that over recent years Africa and the Indian Sub-continent have become relatively more 
important sources of foreign students.  By contrast the numbers of foreign students from 
Europe and the Americas have declined, possibly reflecting tighter economic conditions in 
these countries in recent years.   
Overseas students have increased in importance to UK HE over the last ten years, 
particularly because of the high level of fees charged to these students.  This has led HEIs to 
place a high degree of emphasis on activities intended to attract overseas students, meaning 
that academic staff are often put under pressure to tailor their activities to attracting these 
students. 
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6. Dealing with the Brain Drain –  
        Suggested Policy Responses 
 
Lowell (2001a) sets out a framework for categorising six types of policy response to the 
migration of skilled labour, based on the “the Six R’s”.  The discussion uses this framework to 
summarise a variety of implemented and suggested policies to mitigate or respond to skilled 
labour migration. 
6.1 Reparation 
Reparation covers proposals to compensate developing countries for the loss of skilled 
labour and the lost investment in human capital development or potential future growth that it 
represents.  Lowell (2001a) characterises reparation schemes as linked to expatriate taxation 
proposals promoted in the 1970s.  For instance Bhagwhati (1982; Bhagwati and Hamada, 
1982), developed the notion, gained from the US taxation system, that taxation follows 
citizenship rather than residence.  As such migrants residing in a third country would 
continue to pay income tax to their country of origin, in return for the right of citizenship. 
The United Nations Development Programme has suggested several possible models for a 
reparations tax.  These include a one-time exit tax, a requirement for loan repayment 
equivalent to educational subsidies in the instance of a national migrating, a marginal (e.g. 
1%) flat rate multinational tax for all foreign nationals working abroad, the adoption of the 
Bhagwati-style US principle of taxation related to citizenship or a cooperative multi-lateral 
system for taxing foreign nationals abroad in a similar fashion to Pay As You Earn in the UK 
(UNDP, 2001: 92). 
However, such a direct tax on migrants incomes has problems.  It may act as a disincentive 
to education, because of the reduced effective salary, it would be very difficult to implement 
and may distort trade flows.  Puri and Ritzema (1999) note that such mandatory remittance 
policies have failed in the Philippines, Thailand and other East Asian states because of the 
difficulty in implementation.  Similar policies have had more success in Korea but this is 
related to the specific and unique nature of Korean migration, which tended to be 
concentrated in Korean construction firms in the Middle East, making it easier for migrants’ 
incomes to be taxed. 
However, if reparation for losses were considered not as an income tax issue but as a 
development finance issue, some of these problems might be overcome.  Developed nations 
could, through some type of concessional finance scheme, linked to HIPC or the UK’s 
proposed International Finance Facility (IFF), agree to compensate developing countries 
through resource flows (financial, technical or other) on some agreed calculation of loss of 
investment in human capital.  Such calculations would undoubtedly be extremely difficult to 
agree on, given the nature of multinational negotiations and the ambiguous nature of 
research on the costs of education, the growth and productivity return to education, and the 
poor quality of migration statistics (especially in relation to skills and where investment in 
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human capital actually took place) but by treating this as a general developmental problem 
rather than a technical compensation problem these may be overcome.  In any case, the 
issue deserves somewhat more detailed consideration than the simplistic rejections of the 
notion compensation or reparation by the likes of Lowell (2001a) or Beine et al. (2003). 
6.2 Restriction 
Restriction options refer to regulations placed on either emigration or immigration.  In 
practice the regulation of emigration may signal human rights issues, for it is clear that 
migration may be a response to persecution, intolerance or other issue of political repression.  
Migration is also a rational response to the restriction of economic and social potential. 
Despite this, restrictions on immigration are in practice implemented by most countries and 
these tend to differentiate between political refugees and ‘economic migrants’ (Lowell, 2001).  
As demonstrated above, the trend in these policies is toward differentiation on the basis of 
perceived economic utility to the receiving country (McLaughlin and Salt, 2002; Crush, 2002; 
Home Office, 2005).  Where skills gaps are identified policies tend to make immigration 
easier for migrants possessing complementary skills or competencies.  On the other hand, 
immigration is frequently restricted for ‘economic migrants’ who possess skills already 
present in the receiving country.  While differentiation is not simplistically correlated to levels 
of skills, it does tend to be the most highly skilled that are defined as the most attractive 
immigrants in policies motivated by theories of economic growth and competitiveness 
influenced by perceptions of the importance of human capital for growth. 
The problem with this sort of policy response to the problems posed by skilled migration is 
that it both restricts the freedom of labour and curtails the cultural benefits of mutual 
understanding, tolerance and the advancement of knowledge that arise out of exchange, 
particularly in an academic setting.  Such policies would also be subject to collective 
action/free rider problems in a context of intense global competition and pursuit of 
‘competitiveness’. 
6.3 Return 
Return policies aim to encourage the reintegration of migrants back into the home country 
when they choose to do so.  This is important because many skilled migrants choose not to 
return because of social or regulatory barriers to return such as the loss of some welfare 
benefits.  This can be especially beneficial where the period of migration has resulted in an 
increase in their human capital, thereby effecting a reverse flow of knowledge or skills. 
Indeed, the policies of many developing countries in financing students to study abroad and 
placing restrictions, or bonds, on them to return home and work for a defined period after the 
completion of studies expressly seek to take advantage of this type of benefit, though these 
may not always be successful, with significant leakage of graduates into the country of study 
and other third countries.  Furthermore if foreign study is paid for by developing countries at 
commercial rates, the allocation of benefits becomes more questionable. 
Pellegrino notes the establishment of programmes in both Uruguay and Argentina after the 
end of military dictatorship to facilitate the return of skilled migrants.  For instance, in 
Uruguay the government, with the help of the International Office of Migration, created the 
National Commission for Repatriation which sought to facilitate the return of migrants 
generally but had a specific emphasis on scientists and academics.  These efforts have since 
been augmented with the creation, in 1990, of the Sectoral Commission for Scientific 
Research at the University of the Republic and programmes to develop and reinvigorate 
academic research.  In Argentina, similar efforts were made with the creation of the National 
Commission for the Return of Argentineans Living Abroad in 1984.  The National Council of 
Scientific and Technological Research has specifically targeted academic migrants with 
incentives such as the payment of moving and establishment costs and family travel costs.  
However, despite these initiatives, Pellegrino does not cite any evidence of widespread 
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success and with regard to Argentina, reports that “the response was rather limited, and a 
notable percentage of those who returned did not achieve adequate placement so emigrated 
once again” (Mendoza, quoted in Pellegrino, 2002). 
Lowell (2001) highlights the Return of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN) programme, which 
“aims to develop a country’s economy by seeking persons who are highly trained and 
qualified either to return or find positions in each country that will benefit from that person’s 
training”.  The programme is used by ten African governments including Angola, Cape 
Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  The 
RQAN project will provide some services to returnees such as the payment of return airfares, 
shipment of personal effects, financing of some professional equipment expenses and some 
settling in expenses.  There is also a low interest loan available to facilitate business start-
ups.  Between 1983 and 1999 the programme achieved an average return rate of around 
100 per year. 
In Taiwan, the National Youth Commission has been established to facilitate the return of 
skilled migrants.  The commission acts as an ‘information clearing house’ for academics.  
Korea has also attempted to persuade skilled migrants to return through investment in the 
Korean Institute for Science and Technology, within which returnees are offered a great deal 
of managerial and research autonomy.  Both Korea and Taiwan have attempted to recruit 
older professionals and academics using internationally competitive salaries, enhanced 
working conditions, help with childcare and housing and through the use of visiting professor 
schemes for those unsure about a permanent return.  There is some evidence to suggest 
that these approaches have worked, at least in the Korean case, where return rates for 
scientists with doctorates from the US jumping from 16% in the 1960s to around 60% in the 
1980s (UNDP, 2001). However, it should also be noted that the Korean economy and 
technology structure grew sharply during this period. This is both a direct and indirect causal 
factor in motivating return as it enabled the Korean government to invest significantly in the 
research and higher education system (Meyer and Brown, 1999). 
6.4 Resourcing/Diaspora Policies 
Lowell (2001) identifies two types of diaspora policy: those aimed at promoting 
technology/knowledge transfer and those aimed at promoting financial transfers in the form 
of more or less managed remittance flows.  
The essence of policies designed to promote technology transfer is a shift in perception from 
seeing skilled migration not merely as a human capital loss but also a potential source of 
gain.  This is particularly so in a context where the full benefit of skilled researchers cannot 
be harnessed in the home country due to a lack of research infrastructure, funding and socio-
cognitive networks and research clusters (Meyer and Brown, 1999).  Such policies typically 
foster linkages between skilled migrants abroad and the home country to develop student 
exchanges, collaborative research projects or short-term home visits to engage in teaching 
or consultancy.  Brown estimates that around forty-one such network organisations were 
established during the 1990s (Brown, 2000).  Meyer and Brown (1999) identify networks 
operating in Argentina, Assam, China, Columbia, El Salvador, France, India, Iran, Ireland, 
Japan, Kenya, Korea, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Palestine, Peru, 
Phillipines, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay and Venezuela, with 
many countries operating multiple programmes.  In addition, there are also regional networks 
such as the Asociation Lattino-americaine de Scientifiques (Latin American Association of 
Scientists) (ALAS) and the Network of Arab Scientists and Technologists Abroad (ASTA).  In 
recent years, South Africa has also established the South African Network of Skills Abroad 
(SANSA) (Meyer and Brown, 1999; Kaplan, Meyer and Brown, 1999; Kaplan and Meyer, 
1998), which by the turn of the century had nearly two thousand members, spread among 57 
countries and 5 continents, 34.3% of whom had Doctoral level qualifications (Brown, Kaplan 
and Meyer, 2000). 
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The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) operates the Transfer of Knowledge 
Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programme which seeks to promote short-term 
return of skilled migrants to their country of origin.  The TOKTEN programme operates a 
large number of countries including China, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Syria, Palestine, the 
Philippines, Turkey, the Lebanon and Vietnam.  The Economic Commission for Africa is also 
developing an Afrtican Diaspora Databse to provide a clearinghouse for African experts and 
act as a source of technical skills for development on the continent (UNECA, 1999). 
Logan argues that one of the crucial factors in the establishment of diaspora networks like 
TOKTEN is the exploitation of social and cultural linkages between the diaspora and the 
home country in terms of generating a high degree of commitment to the aims of the project. 
The advantages of the TOKTEN approach are that it is built on “cultural affinity” (experts are 
sent only to their home countries), it is on a volunteer basis, and it allows experts to contribute 
to the development of their home countries without having to make difficult choices over 
lifestyles, legal residency, and citizenship (Logan, 1990). 
A second type of diaspora policy is based on increasing the volume and effectiveness of 
financial transfers.  At one end of the spectrum compulsory remittance schemes can be seen 
as a reparation policy (see above) rather than remittance policy.  However several 
governments have adopted ‘softer’ policies to encourage saving in the home country such as 
government backed development bonds or preferential savings schemes (with favourable 
interest rates).  Several countries, including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Korea have 
instituted foreign currency accounts, some with preferential interest rates.  Other countries, 
like Sri Lanka have instituted specialist accounts but the interest rate has been kept slightly 
below international comparators.  India, Pakistan and Bangladesh also use government 
bonds denominated in foreign currencies to stimulate remittances from workers abroad (Puri 
and Ritzema, 1999).  Such schemes are not only important because they may stimulate 
remittances however.  They are also important in helping to channel remittances into 
productive investment rather than consumption of imports, thereby helping to rectify 
institutional and capacity weaknesses that may have spurred migration in the first place.  
They can thus overcome market failures in terms of access to credit and information (Taylor, 
1999). 
Chikeze (2001) documents an interesting example of a disapora network which also 
facilitated financial resource transfers from the Somali diaspora in the UK and across the 
world to establish a University in Somalia.  The example is thus worth quoting at length: 
“The development of the University of Hargeisa in Somaliland was a project spearheaded by 
the UK Somali community from that region. Against all odds and to much national and 
international acclaim, the newly developed University of Hargeisa (UoH) in Somaliland 
opened its doors in 2000 to the first batch of access course students in preparation for a full 
start in September 2000. Initiated in mid-1997, this effort united Somalis in Somaliland itself 
with Somalis in the diaspora as far-flung as Australia, Sweden, Kuwait, the United States, and 
Britain. The project enjoyed support by the government of Somaliland, a territory still without 
international recognition. A steering committee in London that combined Somali expertise and 
leadership with British know-how and experience worked in close collaboration with an interim 
council in Somaliland. Local businesses in Somaliland took full responsibility for rehabilitating 
the government-donated dilapidated old-school building that was in fact home to over 500 
returned Somali refugees. Somalis in Sweden provided 750 chairs and tables; Kuwait-based 
Somalis sent computers. In the project's second year, the Somaliland Forum, a cyberspace-
based global network of Somalis formed taskforces to tackle specific elements, raised money, 
maintained email groups, and hosted real-time e-conferences.  
The steering committee in London consulted back and forth with the interim council in 
Somaliland - made up of elders, government ministers in formal and personal capacities, local 
business people, and local mayors - to identify the priority academic areas to receive 
immediate attention based on local needs. The steering committee drew on its expertise to 
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write a curriculum for these academic areas, a charter for the university and the business 
plan. 
UoH threw a brain drain into sharp reverse. One-third of the students on the access course 
returned from the Gulf, the UK and Canada to attend. High school students who would either 
have had to leave Somaliland to pursue further studies or drop out now have the option to 
stay. The university's first vice chancellor, an eminent Somali scientist who worked in Canada 
for a number of years, took up post to work pro bono to oversee UoH's crucial first few years.” 
Chikeze (2001). 
6.5 Recruitment 
The spread of competitive recruitment policies as a response to the brain drain on the part of 
both developed and developing countries has already been noted.  However, it is worth 
noting that these policies require the use of resources which naturally disadvantages 
developing countries.  On the other hand, an alternative approach is to regulate recruitment 
activities through placing restrictions on the activities of private sector recruitment agencies.  
It is these agencies that are often identified with some of the most exploitative practices such 
as charging high registration or administrative fees or requiring migrants to work for free a 
period after immigration (Lowell and Findlay, 2001).  The International Labour Organisation 
has promoted the regulation of these agencies as a means of protecting the most vulnerable 
migrants (ILO, 1997).  Other measures might involve the regulation of government activities 
in competing for migrant labour.   For instance, The Commonwealth has established a 
Protocol on Teacher Recruitment “to ensure that the process of teacher recruitment between 
Commonwealth countries occurs in a manner that is beneficial to all parties concerned” 
(Sives et al., 2004) and the UK Department of Health has instituted Guidelines on the 
International Recruitment of Nurses and Code for International Recruitment of Healthcare 
Professionals (UK DoH, 2004).  While the evidence of reductions in recruitment is ambiguous 
(Buchan, 2002), such protocols, if adequately scrutinised, might present a means of 
managing some of the negative effects of competitive brain drain. 
Lowell and Findlay (2001) suggest that the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
may offer one avenue for the effective multilateral regulation of international recruitment.  
However, as other research (AUT, 2002; Nunn, 2002)8 has shown the GATS may also act as 
a lever for the increased commercialisation of higher education on a global scale, with the 
effect of reducing the power of organised labour and collective bargaining with potential to 
make recruitment and human resources policies in universities even more competitive and 
less regulated.  Further, by advancing the commercial education agenda there may be 
increased focus on selling education to developing countries (see Brown, 2005) than 
providing education as a developmental, social and public good.  The prospect of education 
bought solely as an input to economic growth raises profound questions for cultural and 
social reproduction and learning, and cultural imperialism. 
6.6 Retention 
From a trade union perspective retention policies are by far the most desirable.  Such 
policies address the core push factors.  They include addressing issues of poor quality 
governance, political repression and equitable economic development for cohesive societies.  
In the specific case of academics and researchers these policies include investing in 
research and teaching infrastructure, expanding the HE system and promoting academic 
freedom.  Measures also include addressing pay and terms and conditions differentials, 
workers rights and strengthening the power of collective representation and bargaining 
                                                
8 See also http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/soe/cihe/inhea/pubs_theme/GATS_Education.htm for a 
comprehensive bibliography on the impact of GATS on HE. 
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through strengthening trade unions.  For instance Logan (2000) argues that for the 
importance of “institutional personnel reform to address entry-level conditions of service (this 
must proceed beyond salary remediation to include, for example, benefits for household 
dependents, academic freedom (depoliticized academic environment), and a clearly defined 
and transparent structure of reward for merit)”.  The ICFTU also suggest investment in key 
services and infrastructure, the promotion of workers’ rights and better salaries and terms 
and conditions in developing countries would protect against the more damaging impacts of 
skilled migration (ICFTU, 2004b).  Effective enforcement of existing charters and declarations 
of rights for migrant and all workers would also be useful in retaining skilled workers in 
developing countries. 
Global policies to generate development may not be sufficient to offset the impact of brain 
drain factors.  Indeed, there is considerable and building evidence that they will not meet the 
less ambitious MDGs (Sachs, 2005; World Bank, 2004a).  Moreover, by defining the 
‘problem’ almost exclusively in terms of helping only the most poor developing nations with 
regard to quite narrow measures of absolute poverty, global development policies may 
actually be further embedding the conditions in which the Brain Drain will accelerate.  This is 
because skilled migration tends to be from countries with a given level of development to 
enable a relatively successful education system.  Skilled migration then acts as one potential 
barrier to moving beyond a given level of development.  It may also accelerate if 
development stalls, or in even short periods of recession.  In an environment where 
international competition for key skills is likely to increase, there is a need to revisit the 
dominant development paradigm, particularly with regard to replacing the focus on absolute 
poverty to one of equality, between and within states. 
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7. Suggestions for AUT/NATFHE  
         Action Points 
 
This section does not include recommendations as such.  Rather, the discussion below 
suggests different areas in which AUT and NATFHE may want to develop policy and 
suggests some action points to take forward. 
7.1 Promote Development, Poverty and Inequality Reduction 
AUT/NATFHE may wish to promote the retention of skilled workers including academics and 
researchers in developing countries through advocating appropriate development in the 
developing world.  In doing so, AUT/NATFHE may wish to give thought to the most 
appropriate model of development including a reconsideration of ‘poverty reduction’ and 
whether there is a greater role for equality within and between states.  In any event, 
AUT/NATFHE may wish to highlight the benefits of increased spending on education and 
particularly on higher education.  This may include supporting the recent Commission for 
Africa (established and Chaired by Tony Blair) recommendation that the international 
community should commit additional development assistance to the task of developing 
capacity in research, technology and higher education institutions in Africa (Commission for 
Africa, 2005: 130-1).  AUT/NATFHE may also wish to promote the role of teachers and 
academic trade unions in securing and upholding quality in educational provision, both in the 
UK and in the developing world.  This may include strengthening engagement with 
international discussions on regulation and standardisation. 
Action Point: Lobby the UK government directly and foreign governments and 
development institutions through Education International to increase resources and 
emphasis on development, poverty and inequality reduction. 
7.2 Promote the Development of Protocols on International Recruitment 
Consider the development of protocols to regulate international recruitment practises in line 
with other sectors. The focus of these should not be to limit migration, but to regulate the 
manner in which academics are recruited and to balance the rights of individuals to migrate 
with the needs of education systems in developing countries. 
Protocols need to recognise the clear benefits which accrue to developed countries from 
international recruitment along with the potentially negative impact on developing countries' 
capacity to develop. They must therefore provide developing countries with recourse to 
internationally mediated agreements which recognise the rights and responsibilities of both 
sending and receiving countries. Receiving countries also need to recognise their obligations 
in depriving other countries of scarce resources, and this should be reflected in those 
agreements. 
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Discussion on such protocols could centre on a number of factors, for example the need to 
protect academics who migrate to the UK, minimum acceptable standards of treatment and 
ensuring that foreign nationals are fully protected and treated equally to domestic labour. 
Such protocols could also be used to facilitate the return to home countries where individuals 
wish to do this. They would need to include the necessary employment, social and social 
security provisions. 
Protocols might also provide an opportunity for leverage with employers and developed 
country governments to establish mechanisms to ensure that developing countries draw the 
maximum possible benefit from skilled migration. This would include technology and 
knowledge transfer, exchanges and access to partnerships and research networks as well as 
establishing (voluntary) efficient and development orientated remittance schemes (see 7.4). 
Action Point: Discuss the implications and feasibility of such protocols with 
development institutions and Education International. Discuss the feasibility of 
adopting minimum standards for international recruitment with UCEA and HEIs". 
7.3 Promote Debate on Potential Compensatory Mechanisms 
While some migration experts dismiss the idea of reparations or compensation, they tend to 
do so from the point of view of a direct tax on labour.  However, a more developmentally 
focused compensatory system which merely acknowledges the resource transfer involved in 
high skilled migration may overcome many of their cited objections.  These resource flows 
might be particularly targeted at education investment, offsetting some of the loss.  Clearly 
any proposed structure would require substantial further research but promoting debate on 
the introduction of a compensatory mechanism may raise the profile of brain drain issues in a 
positive and policy-focused manner, helping it to move away from the sensationalist and 
anecdotal style that has accompanied media stories of the Brain Drain. 
Action Point: Promote debate on the benefits/costs and possible structures for a 
multilateral human capital loss compensation facility within national, European and 
global fora including trade union and inter-governmental networks. 
7.4 Accentuate Potential Beneficial Impacts of Skilled Migration 
There are a number of ways in which the potential beneficial elements of the Brain Drain 
might be facilitated and accentuated: 
• Promote the information and opportunities for the return of skilled migrants after a period of 
time.  Linkages with the International Office of Migration in the UK, which operates a web-
based database of opportunities as part of a re-integration project could be developed.  
Linkages with the various UN programmes for temporary return might also be established. 
• Student and staff exchanges between universities in the UK and in the developing world to 
promote two-way knowledge transfer.  Purposefully designed structures should be developed 
for these exchanges to ensure that knowledge and skills sharing is maximised. 
• Encouraging HEIs to allow the non-commercial licensing of teaching materials.  MIT’s 
OpenCourseWare might be used as a model for this.  However, HEIs might also be 
encouraged to develop a shared resource for HE teachers and researchers.  Links might also 
be made to publishers around access to online journal subscriptions. 
• Encouraging HEIs to develop non-commercial partnerships with HEIs in the developing world 
to facilitate exchanges and knowledge sharing. 
• Promote joint research networks to allow researchers in the developing world access to 
research facilities.  This would be a two-way exchange with HEIs benefiting from the skills 
and potential of researchers in the developing world without having to compete for their skills 
on an international market. 
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• Support the development of diaspora networks by promoting online registers of academics 
from developing countries.  This might act as a clearing-house for skills in a similar way to the 
UNDP’s TOKTEN programme. 
• Encourage academic staff to volunteer for beneficial projects overseas, for instance through 
VSO. 
Each of these approaches will require different actions.  However in the main they will involve 
AUT/NATFHE lobbying government and employers to adopt these or similar proposals. 
Action Point: Lobby government (DfES/DfID/HM Treasury) to adopt some, all or similar 
proposals to those set out above. 
7.5 Protect Core Labour Standards, Trade Union Rights and Academic 
Freedom 
At the heart of much of the Brain Drain debate lies the central challenge for trade unions: 
protecting the rights and advancing the interests of labour. The globalisation of labour 
markets, whether by capital or labour mobility, raises significant questions for the future of 
collective organisation.  This is because the globalisation of labour markets has in many 
industries been associated with increasing competition between nationally and sub-nationally 
organised labour for scarce investment.  The result, while often over-played (not least by 
employers), has been the much publicised ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of wages, 
employment conditions, labour and investment regulations.  It is important that competition 
for scarce and valued but segmented parts of the global labour force does not also create 
damaging social ‘externalities’.  As such, a core element of protecting the interests of far off 
societies is protecting Core Labour Standards, trade union, employment and socio-economic 
rights at home. In addition, the special nature of academic labour and the specific ‘push’ 
factors associated with it in terms of international migration, mean that protecting academic 
freedom is also important. 
As such AUT/NATFHE will need to renew their efforts to support the international trade union 
campaign to gain universal recognition of the International Labour Organisation’s eight 
Fundamental Conventions including on: 
• Freedom of Association (Conventions 87 and 98). 
• The Abolition of Forced Labour (Conventions 29 and 105). 
• Equality (Conventions 111 and 100). 
• The Elimination of Child Labour (Conventions 138 and 182). 
DfID (2004) has recently endorsed the view that respect for core labour standards is 
essential for poverty reduction.  However, work remains to secure full UK government 
commitment to upholding and promoting these standards in developing countries and 
AUT/NATFHE may wish to work with the TUC to achieve this.  Work also remains to ensure 
that these core labour standards take full legal precedence over other international 
agreements on trade and investment rules. 
In addition to core labour standards, this research has revealed the importance of rights 
associated with academic labour such as autonomy in research, publishing and teaching.  
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UN, 1948) and the UNESCO recommendations 
Concerning the Rights of Higher Education Personnel (1997) Against Discrimination in 
Teaching (1960; 1962), On Education for International Understanding and Cooperation and 
Peace and Education relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1974) and On 
the Status of Scientific Researchers (1974). 
Action Point: Lobby government (DfES/DfID/HM Treasury/DTI) to more vigorously 
promote universal respect and upholding of core labour standards and Academic 
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Freedom and to support the inclusion of the Fundamental Conventions within bilateral 
and multilateral (including in the WTO) trade and investment agreements. 
Action Point: Lobby government and work through Education International to secure 
universal application and respect for academic freedom as a fundamental human 
right. 
There will be a need also to work more closely with academic trade unions in the developing 
world. One means of doing so might be to facilitate trade union exchanges or to develop 
‘membership passports’ or reciprocal recognition agreements, especially where academic 
trade unions in the developing world were able to retain the subscriptions of migrant workers 
in order to prevent organised labour from also losing from Brain Drain effects. 
Action Point: Strengthen international linkages with academic trade unions in the 
developing world and work to support trade union organising in the developing world, 
including through mutual recognition agreements. 
AUT/NATFHE may also give thought to developing universal welcome packs including 
advice on settling in the UK, points of contact for information, summaries of employment and 
academic rights, information about trade union recognition agreements and diaspora 
networks, remittance schemes and student/staff exchange programmes so that incoming 
migrants have the information available to them to promote beneficial feed-back effects if 
they are so motivated.  These could be modelled on the TUC’s (2002) Migrant Workers – A 
TUC Guide but adapted to give HE-specific information.  This may also include details of the 
DfID research on providers and links to www.sendmoneyhome.org.  
Action Point: Develop Information Resources for foreign nationals working in HE in 
the UK. 
7.6 Promote Debate and Awareness of the ‘Brain Drain’ 
A key area of policy development for AUT/NATFHE is the promotion of awareness and 
debate on the Brain Drain and its potential impact on development. This will involve work 
with members in the UK and with international partners, such as Education International, and 
trade unions in the developing world. 
Action Point: Organise a major conference to promote awareness among members 
and partners of the Brain Drain and its impact on the development potential of 
developing countries. 
Action Point: Develop and distribute materials for members promoting awareness of 
the Brain Drain and its impact on the development potential of developing countries 
and including guidance on what members and Local Associations/Branches can do. 
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